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HARRIS V. QUINN AND THE 
CONTRADICTIONS OF COMPELLED SPEECH 
Catherine L. Fisk & Margaux Poueymirou∗ 
          In Harris v. Quinn, the Supreme Court held that unionized home-
care workers have a First Amendment right to refuse to pay their fair 
share of the cost of services that the union is statutorily required to 
provide. The Court thus transformed what had been a legislative debate 
about “right-to-work” laws, which about half of states have adopted, 
into a constitutional requirement for one narrow category of public 
sector employees. The problem with transforming this policy argument 
into a First Amendment requirement is that treating fair-share or 
agency-fee payments to a union as compelled speech raises First 
Amendment rights of both supporters and opponents of the union. If 
expenditures on union representation are speech—as the majority in 
Harris thinks they are—then the union’s obligation to provide free 
representation compels speech by the union and its members. While, in 
our view, the requirement to pay for services is not compelled speech, 
the Court’s entire agency-fee jurisprudence, including Harris, insists 
that it is. On the Court’s analysis, contracts that require unionized 
employees to pay for union representational services compel speech of 
dissenters exactly to the same extent that their prohibition compels 
speech of unions and their members. Accordingly, the Court must alter 
its usual analysis of the constitutionality of agency-fee agreements and 
recognize that union representation requires balancing competing 
freedom of speech and association interests. Once the First Amendment 
rights of unions and union members are recognized, agency fees 
emerge as a constitutionally sound accommodation of the interests of 
dissenters, unions, and union members. 
∗  The authors are, respectively, Chancellor’s Professor of Law at and a 2015 graduate of
the University of California, Irvine School of Law. They gratefully acknowledge comments from 
Nick Hartmann and research assistance from Christina Tsou. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
In Harris v. Quinn,1 the Supreme Court held that unionized 
home-care workers have a First Amendment right to refuse to pay 
their fair share of the cost of services that the union is statutorily 
required to provide.2 The Court therefore invalidated a fair-share (or 
agency) fee provision of a collective bargaining agreement between 
Illinois and the Service Employees International Union’s Illinois 
health care local (SEIU-HII) representing home-care workers paid 
with Medicaid funds.3 The Court thus transformed what had been a 
legislative debate about so-called “right-to-work” laws, which about 
half of states have adopted,4 into a constitutional requirement for one 
narrow category of public sector employees.   
Right-to-work laws have long been controversial. Supporters say 
they prevent workers from being compelled to provide financial 
support to a union that they do not want.5 Critics insist that 
right-to-work laws compel unions and their dues-paying members to 
expend money on behalf of nonmembers; they argue that if a 
majority of employees choose union representation, everyone gets 
the benefits and everyone should share in the costs.6 The problem 
with transforming this policy debate into a First Amendment 
requirement, we will explain, is that treating fair-share payments to a 
union as compelled speech raises First Amendment rights of both 
supporters and opponents of the union. If expenditures on union 
representation are speech—as the majority in Harris thinks, but, as 
we explain below, we do not—then the union’s obligation to provide 
free representation compels speech by the union and its members. 
Our argument comprises three interrelated contentions. First, 
unions possess First Amendment rights as “expressive associations.”7 
1. 134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014).
2. Id. at 2644.
3. Collective Bargaining Agreement, ILL. DEP’T OF CENT. MGMT. SERVS. (Dec. 16, 2013),
http://www2.illinois.gov/cms/Employees/Personnel/Documents/emp_seiupast.pdf. 
4. Right to Work Resources, NAT’L CONFERENCE STATE LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/labor/right-to-work-laws-and-bills.aspx (last visited Sept. 7, 
2013).   
5. See, e.g., Right to Work, AFL-CIO, http://www.aflcio.org/Legislation-and-Politics/State
-Legislative-Battles/Ongoing-State-Legislative-Attacks/Right-to-Work (last visited Feb. 7, 2015).
6. See, e.g., Right to Work Frequently-Asked Questions, NAT’L RIGHT TO WORK LEGAL 
DEF. FOUND. INC., http://www.nrtw.org/b/rtw_faq.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2015). 
7. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984); see infra Section IV for a discussion
of how unions satisfy the criteria established in the Court’s expressive association jurisprudence 
beginning with Jaycees.  
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The failure to recognize these rights has led the Court to restrict how 
unions raise and spend money without applying the same restrictions 
to corporations and other associations. The Court’s union-dues 
objector cases are thus out of step with its campaign finance and 
freedom of association jurisprudence.8 Second, to the extent the 
Court continues to enable or require states to prohibit unions from 
collecting agency fees, the duty of fair representation in the 
right-to-work context, which forces unions and their members to pay 
for legal and other services for non-paying workers, is 
unconstitutional on the Court’s own analysis. While, in our view, the 
requirement to pay for services is not compelled speech, the Court’s 
entire agency-fee jurisprudence, including Harris, insists that it is. 
On the Court’s analysis, contracts requiring unionized employees to 
pay for union representational services compel speech of dissenters 
exactly to the same extent that their prohibition compels speech of 
unions and their members. Accordingly, and this is our third 
argument, the Court must alter its usual analysis of the 
constitutionality of agency fees and recognize that union 
representation requires balancing competing freedom of speech and 
association interests. The Court has recognized that “unions have the 
right under the First Amendment to express their views on political 
and social issues without government interference.”9 In our view, 
agency fees do not compel speech of union dissenters any more than 
the duty of fair representation compels speech of unions in 
right-to-work states. But the Court thinks otherwise. Once the First 
Amendment rights of unions and union members are recognized, 
agency fees emerge as a constitutionally sound accommodation of 
the interests of dissenters, unions, and union members. They allow 
unions to collect from every represented person the pro rata cost of 
contract negotiation and administration but prohibit collecting fees 
for expressive activity not germane to contract negotiation and 
8. Others, including one of these authors, have previously examined the Court’s unequal
treatment of the speech rights of unions and corporations. See Catherine L. Fisk & Erwin 
Chemerinsky, Political Speech and Association Rights After Knox v. SEIU, Local 1000, 98 
CORNELL L. REV. 1023 (2013); Charlotte Garden, Citizens, United and Citizens United: The 
Future of Labor Speech Rights? 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (2011); Benjamin I. Sachs, Unions, 
Corporations, and Political Opt-Out Rights After Citizens United, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 800 
(2012).  
9. Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2295 (2012).
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administration, thus accommodating the expressive interests of union 
members and opponents alike. 
This Article’s structure is as follows. First, in Part II, we explain 
Harris and the dues-objector cases that preceded it. In Part III, we 
explain that fair-share fees—payment of money to an organization in 
exchange for services—should be held to raise no viable First 
Amendment claim. In Part IV, we explore the First Amendment 
rights of unions and their members and explain that if the payment of 
fees for contract negotiation and administration is compelled speech, 
then it is equally compelled speech to require, as Harris does, a 
union to expend money to negotiate and administer a contract on 
behalf of free-riding nonpayers. In sum, the same First Amendment 
analysis that led the Court to conclude that right-to-work is 
constitutionally compelled for home-care workers leads also to the 
conclusion that right-to-work laws are unconstitutional for other 
workers. 
In Part V, we consider union representation in the post-Harris 
world. In particular, we explore the implications of Harris for the 
duty of fair representation, exclusivity, and agency fees. Although 
agency fees were originally designed to protect the First Amendment 
rights of nonmembers, once the First Amendment interests of unions 
and union members are thrown into the mix, agency fees acquire 
even stronger constitutional support. They protect three sets of 
interests simultaneously: nonmembers from having to subsidize the 
political and ideological pursuits of the union, union members from 
having to subsidize representational services for nonpaying 
nonmembers, and unions who strive to protect their workers’ 
interests and can only do so when they are able to fully participate in 
the political sphere. Rather than force unions and their members to 
pay for services for nonpaying nonmembers (as Harris requires), or 
nonmembers to pay for political activities by unions and their 
members, the reasonable compromise is the pre-Harris rule in 
non-right-to-work states: the union must represent nonmembers, and 
nonmembers can be required to pay only that portion of dues 
attributable to representation. 
444 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:439 
II. HARRIS V. QUINN AND THE ORIGIN OF FAIR-SHARE FEES
A. The Background of Harris v. Quinn and
the Law of Agency Fees 
1. Unionization of Home-Care Work
Home-care work is, according to the U.S. Department of Labor, 
one of the fastest growing occupations. This growth has been fueled 
by an aging population that desires to stay home longer and by the 
recognition that in-home care is more economical than institutional 
care.10 Like many other services—health care, fire protection, and 
parks and open spaces protection—home-care work was formerly 
provided privately or through charity but became government-funded 
and government-regulated as governments began to see the service 
as a public good rather than a private obligation.11 Today, almost 
every state pays for in-home care through the Medicaid program.12 
And, thus, home-care workers—like firefighters, teachers, librarians, 
and park rangers before them—became government employees once 
the government started paying their wages and asserting regulatory 
control over them. Illinois, along with many other states, eventually 
chose to make state-funded home-care workers part of the 
government workforce.13 
The home-care labor force, which is predominantly female and 
immigrant,14 began to organize unions in the 1980s to improve 
wages and working conditions. In states where state-paid home-care 
workers have a right to unionize and bargain collectively, the state 
agencies that oversee home-care work recognize that a unionized 
labor force can ensure a higher caliber of service by reducing 
competition from lower-paid and less-skilled providers. Illinois 
argued precisely this in Harris—that unionization benefitted the state 
10. Melanie Trottman & Kris Maher, Labor Department Adds Protection for
Home-Health-Care Workers, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 18, 2013, 12:05 AM), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323981304579081251516291502. 
11. See EILEEN BORIS & JENNIFER KLEIN, CARING FOR AMERICA: HOME HEALTH
WORKERS IN THE SHADOW OF THE WELFARE STATE ch. 1 (2012). 
12. Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2623 (citing JANET O’KEEFFE ET AL., DEP’T OF 
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., UNDERSTANDING MEDICAID HOME AND COMMUNITY SERVICES: 
A PRIMER (2010)). 
13. See Peggie R. Smith, The Publicization of Home-Based Care Work in State Labor Law,
92 MINN. L. REV. 1390, 1403–04 (2008). 
14. See Peggie R. Smith, Who Will Care for the Elderly?, 61 BUFF. L. REV. 323, 328–29
(2013). 
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government by regularizing and rationalizing a labor market for the 
twenty thousand workers in its Disabilities Program. The state and 
union supporters argued that unionization benefited the recipients of 
care by facilitating the training and recruitment of workers, and even 
critics of unions must concede that in Illinois, wages rose and health 
benefits were provided to home-care workers as a result of 
unionization. 
Under the Illinois law at issue in Harris, a care recipient (called 
a customer) first establishes, in consultation with his physician and a 
government program counselor, that he is eligible for Medicaid-paid 
in-home care. The recipient then selects and supervises the worker 
(called a personal assistant) from the pool of people who meet the 
state program requirements. The state determines the hourly wage 
and pays the personal assistant directly, withholding income taxes. 
The state sets minimum requirements for personal assistants, dictates 
the terms of the employment agreement, and requires personal 
assistants to provide recommendations from past employers and have 
related work experience or training.15 A state-employed counselor 
works with the customer to develop a service plan detailing the 
assistant’s job responsibilities, hours, and working conditions, and 
also helps the customer conduct the state-mandated annual 
performance review of the assistant and mediates disagreements 
between the customer and the assistant.16 After legal setbacks, 
Illinois amended its public sector labor law in 2003 to cover personal 
assistants, who are state employees for purposes of collective 
bargaining.17 A majority of the workers chose to unionize, and since 
2003 the SEIU-HII has negotiated three successive collective 
bargaining agreements raising wages and improving working 
conditions of the personal assistants.18 
Over the nine years from the first collective bargaining 
agreement in 2003 to the one in effect as of this writing, wages 
increased for home-care workers in Illinois from $7 per hour to 
$11.65 an hour, going up to $13 on December 1, 2014. Moreover, 
15. Id.; ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 89, §§ 686.10, 686.40 (2013).
16. ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 89, §§ 686.10, 686.30, 686.40; see also Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2647
(Kagan, J., dissenting) (explaining a counselor develops a service plan, assists the customer in 
state-mandated performance review, and mediates any resulting disagreements). 
17. Public Act 93-204, 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 313/3(n)–(o), 315/7 (2013).
18. The current CBA is available on the Illinois Department of Central Management
Services website. Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 3. 
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the agreements provided health benefits through a fund designed and 
administered by the union, to which the state contributes 75 cents an 
hour (for a total annual state contribution in 2013–2014 of $27 
million). And the agreements established a state-funded training 
program administered jointly by the state and the union, while also 
providing assistants with the ability to attend a training program on 
state-paid time. Furthermore, the agreements required the state to 
provide safety equipment (such as gloves); created a process for 
addressing safety issues; and helped both assistants find jobs and 
customers select an assistant by creating a registry and requiring the 
state to run criminal background checks on prospective assistants. 
The agreements created a grievance and arbitration system to resolve 
payment issues and other contractual disputes and provided that the 
state and the union would work together to address late, lost, or 
inaccurate paychecks.19 
Six states allow for unionization of state-paid home-care 
workers on models like Illinois’s: California, Connecticut, 
Minnesota, Missouri, Oregon, and Washington.20 Home-care 
workers in all of these states have voted to unionize and unions have 
gained a variety of wage, benefit, and working condition 
improvements through collective bargaining.21 In addition, although 
19. Id.; see also Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2641 (explaining that “a procedure was established to
resolve grievances arising under the collective-bargaining agreement”). 
20. California enacted legislation in 1999 (AB 1682, Ch. 90, 1999), which required all
counties that had not yet done so to either establish a public authority or adopt one of the alternate 
methods provided in statute for managing their home-care workforce. Subsequent legislation, AB 
2235 (Ch. 1135, 2002), provided that any county that had not adopted one of the alternatives set 
forth in AB 1682 by January 1, 2003, would be required to become the employer of its home-care 
workers. In Washington, Oregon, and Missouri, home-care workers won bargaining rights 
through voter initiatives that were later implemented by legislation, and all three of these states 
provide that a government official or agency is the employer of record for purposes of bargaining. 
See OR. REV. STAT. §§ 410.595–625 (2014); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 7439A.095, 7439.A.30, 
7439.A.220–.300, 41.56.026 (2010); MO. REV. STAT. § 208.856–865 (2013). In Massachusetts, 
Maryland, and Connecticut, home-care workers won bargaining rights through executive order 
followed by legislation: MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 118E, §§ 70–75 (West 2006); MD. CODE 
ANN., Health-Gen. §§ 15-901-07 (LexisNexis 2014) (enacted in 2011), Md. Exec. Order 
01.01.2007.15 (2007); Public Act 12-33, codified at CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17b-1706 (2014) 
(passed in 2012). Vermont and Minnesota have legislation granting bargaining rights to home-
care workers, and the Minnesota workers secured a contract effective July 1, 2015. Act 48 of 
2013, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 1631–44 (2013); 2013 Minn. Laws ch. 128; Home Care Workers 
Celebrate Legislative Passage of Historic First Contract, SEIUHEALTHCAREMN.ORG (May 25, 
2015), http://www.seiuhealthcaremn.org/2015/05/26/home-care-workers-celebrate-legislative 
-passage-of-historic-first-contract/.
21. See SEIU Local 503, Overview of Home Care Collective Bargaining, SEIU503.ORG
(Dec. 13, 2013), http://www.seiu503.org/2013/12/overview-of-home care-collective-bargaining/. 
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this is an issue beyond the scope of this Article, sixteen states have 
enacted laws providing for unionization of some publicly subsidized 
in-home child care workers, although some of the models differ from 
that of the Medicaid-paid home-care workers.22 
2. Collective Bargaining and Agency Fees
Laws protecting the right to unionize and bargain collectively 
typically provide that when a majority of workers form a union and 
secure recognition of their union from the employer, the union 
becomes the exclusive representative of the employees for purposes 
of bargaining over wages and other conditions of employment, which 
means that the employer cannot bargain over those topics with 
employees individually or with any other union.23 A corollary of the 
power conferred by the principle of exclusive representation is that 
the union has the duty to represent all employees fairly and 
adequately in negotiating and enforcing the contract.24 This duty of 
fair representation applies to all workers in the bargaining unit, even 
though employees can choose not to join the union or to pay dues to 
it.25 
Unions and their members have often considered employees 
who do not support the union to be a threat to their power to secure 
the best possible working conditions because the power of the union 
comes from its ability to speak with one voice on behalf of all 
workers.26 Early in the history of labor-management relations, some 
22. The states with bargaining rights for in-home child care workers are Oregon, Iowa, New
Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Kansas, Maryland, New Mexico, Connecticut, Massachusetts, 
Rhode Island, and Ohio. Minnesota enacted legislation authorizing home-based childcare 
providers to organize, but that law has been stayed by court order. HELEN BLANK ET AL., NAT’L 
WOMEN’S LAW CTR., GETTING ORGANIZED: UNIONIZING HOME-BASED CHILD CARE 
PROVIDERS (Feb. 2014), available at http://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/nwlc_gettingor
ganized2013update.pdf. 
23. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (2012). See generally MARTIN H. MALIN ET. AL., PUBLIC
SECTOR EMPLOYMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS 341–46 (2d ed. 2011) (discussing principle of 
exclusive representation in public sector labor relations). 
24. See Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 194 (1944).
25. Id. at 202; see also id. at 204 (“So long as a labor union assumes to act as the statutory
representative of a craft, it cannot rightly refuse to perform the duty, which is inseparable from 
the power of representation conferred upon it, to represent the entire membership of the craft . . . 
[and it must] represent non-union or minority union members of the craft without hostile 
discrimination, fairly, impartially, and in good faith.”). 
26. See generally KENNETH DAU-SCHMIDT ET AL., LABOR LAW IN THE CONTEMPORARY 
WORKPLACE 1039 (2d ed. 2014) (exploring the history and development of laws governing 
organized labor, with strong emphasis on dimensions of political and social power at play 
between employers, employees, unions, and government). 
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unions and employers therefore agreed to require all employees to be 
union members. These types of contract terms were known as union 
security agreements, and they took a variety of forms, ranging from 
requirements that prospective employees must be a union member at 
the time of hire (closed shop), to those requiring employees to join 
the union shortly after hire (union shop), to those requiring every 
employee simply to pay the equivalent of union dues to cover the 
employee’s pro rata share of the union’s cost as exclusive bargaining 
representative (agency shop).27 From the union’s perspective, union 
security agreements maximize a union’s bargaining power, and from 
the employer’s perspective, limiting the labor pool to union members 
can ensure workers meet the union’s standards of training and 
experience. (This is still the view of the medical and legal 
professions today.) 
Union security agreements were controversial in some cases, 
and so a number of states enacted so-called “right-to-work” laws 
prohibiting them. Under Section 14(b) of the National Labor 
Relations Act (NLRA), these state right-to-work laws are saved from 
federal preemption.28 Labor groups challenged the constitutionality 
of right-to-work laws on two grounds: they denied union workers 
and their employers the right to agree to the contract terms that they 
preferred, and they denied union workers the right to associate in the 
workplace only with those who shared their commitment to 
improved working conditions through unionization.29 The Court 
rejected these constitutional challenges, finding that the freedom of 
contract arguments had been repudiated with the demise of the 
Lochner era and that a statute prohibiting discrimination on the basis 
of union membership did not infringe union members’ freedom of 
association.30 
Until Harris, the law with respect to union security was as 
follows. First, in the private sector and in the majority of states that 
allow government employees to unionize, a union is the exclusive 
representative of employees when a majority of employees choose to 
unionize, and the union owes the duty of fair representation to all 
27. See id. ch. 8.
28. 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (2012).
29. Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Nw. Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525, 529 (1949); see infra
text accompanying notes 111. 
30. Id. at 537.
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employees it represents.31 Second, it is illegal in every state for an 
employer and union to agree that workers must either be union 
members or become members at the time of hire.32 Third, in the half 
of states without right-to-work legislation, unions and employers can 
require employees to pay an agency fee representing the employee’s 
fair share of the union’s costs germane to its role as exclusive 
bargaining representative; however, employees who choose not to 
join the union cannot be required to share the union’s costs for 
political activities not germane to contract negotiation and 
administration.33 Fourth, in the remaining states that ban any form of 
union security provision (the so-called “right-to-work” states), the 
union owes a duty of fair representation to all workers but cannot 
require them to pay what members pay to cover its costs.34 
Harris made Illinois a right-to-work state for its home-care 
workers only; private sector and government employers can continue 
to negotiate agency-fee provisions for all other workers in the state. 
Therefore, while Illinois is not a right-to-work state, it now 
encompasses a right-to-work regime that only applies to certain 
home-care workers paid with Medicaid funds.  
3. The Background of Harris v. Quinn
Harris is the product of a litigation and legislative campaign of 
National Right to Work (NRTW), a corporate-funded organization 
that seeks to dismantle unions and the regulatory regime built on 
worker collective action. The organization’s particular focus in sixty 
years of federal and state litigation and legislative efforts has been 
union security agreements. NRTW has been the driving force behind 
efforts to prohibit union security agreements by legislation or ballot 
31. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 186 (1967); Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323
U.S. 192, 202–03 (1944). 
32. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 743–45 (1963).
33. See Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass’n, 500 U.S. 507, 519 (1991); Commc’ns Workers of
Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 762–63 (1988); Abood v. Detroit Bd. Of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977). 
34. Retail Clerks Int’l Ass’n Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 756–57 (1963).
One of us has argued elsewhere that section 14(b) should be read to preempt state right-to-work 
laws to the extent that they prohibit contract provisions requiring employees to pay less than the 
full amount of union dues and, alternatively, that in any state where employees are permitted to 
avoid paying anything to unions, federal law should either allow unions to represent only those 
who choose to become union members and pay dues or should allow unions to charge nonpaying 
nonmembers if they wish the union to represent them in disciplinary matters. Catherine Fisk & 
Benjamin Sachs, Restoring Equity in Right-to-Work Law, 4 U.C. IRV. L. REV. 857 (2014). 
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initiative. And it has litigated every major case on this topic at the 
Supreme Court, including most of the cases discussed here. 
The NRTW theory has changed little over sixty years. In its 
view, employment agreements requiring workers to join a union or to 
finance any of its operations violate employees’ First Amendment 
rights. In the first Supreme Court case on this, Railway Employees 
Department v. Hanson35 in 1956, NRTW argued that the Railway 
Labor Act (RLA), which enables railways and airlines to negotiate 
union security provisions, violated the First Amendment because it 
allows the contracts to compel employees to support unions.36 The 
Court rejected this argument, holding that the contractual 
requirement that employees pay for the services that the union was 
required to provide was not compelled speech.37 But five years later, 
in International Ass’n of Machinists v. Street,38 the Court suggested 
that railroad collective bargaining agreements that require payment 
of union dues or fees do raise First Amendment issues of compelled 
speech to the extent that the union spends the money to support 
political causes including candidates for public office and political 
programs.39 The Court avoided the First Amendment issue by 
35. 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
36. Brief for the National Right to Work Committee as Amicus Curiae, Hanson, 351 U.S.
225 (No. 451), 1956 WL 88890. 
37. Because the payments were required by a contract between private entities (a railroad
and a union), there was no state action and the First Amendment would ordinarily not apply. The 
Court found state action in the Railway Labor Act preempting Nebraska law that prohibited such 
provisions. Justice Douglas explained: 
If private rights are being invaded, it is by force of an agreement made pursuant to 
federal law which expressly declares that state law is superseded. In other words, the 
federal statute is the source of the power and authority by which any private rights are 
lost or sacrificed.4 The enactment of the federal statute authorizing union shop 
agreements is the governmental action on which the Constitution operates, though it 
takes a private agreement to invoke the federal sanction. 
Hanson, 351 U.S. at 232 (internal citations omitted). This is a variation of the state action analysis 
the Court adopted in Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948), holding that government 
enforcement of a private contract is state action. The Court has never extended Shelley beyond 
restrictive covenants, for to do so would turn all private contracts into state action. And it has 
never extended beyond Street the principle that preemption of state law invalidating a contract 
makes the contract term state action. If this position were accepted today, it would raise a 
constitutional issue in employment, consumer, and other agreements containing arbitration 
provisions. The Federal Arbitration Act preempts state laws that limit the enforceability of 
arbitration agreements, which many state laws deem waivers of constitutional rights to jury trial 
or to access courts.  
38. 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
39. Id. at 768–69.
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reading the RLA not to authorize union security provisions that 
require employees to pay fees to support political activity.40   
Three aspects of Hanson and Street are noteworthy because the 
Court in Harris disregarded them. First, the Court in Street 
emphasized that Congress in enacting the RLA had chosen to rely on 
private entities—railroads, airlines, and the unions representing 
employees in those industries—to develop and administer rules and 
processes to ensure that employees were properly trained, that 
working conditions in these dangerous and difficult jobs were safe, 
that wages and benefits were sufficient to attract and retain a talented 
workforce, and that issues about working conditions were resolved 
peacefully among the transportation company managers and 
employees who were in the best position to resolve them.41 This 
regulatory framework, Congress and the Court realized, “entails the 
expenditure of considerable funds.”42 Whereas the companies could 
recoup their share of the costs through increased fares, unions had to 
rely on member dues. As the Court explained, “because of the 
expense of performing their duties in the congressional scheme, 
fairness justified the spreading of the costs to all employees who 
benefited. They [the unions] advanced as their purpose the 
elimination of the ‘free riders’—those employees who obtained the 
benefits of the unions’ participation in the machinery of the Act 
without financially supporting the unions.”43 
Second, the Court did not accept the argument that contracts 
requiring employees to pay their fair share of the costs of 
maintaining the regulatory system constituted compelled speech or 
compelled association when the union used the money to perform the 
services it is statutorily required to provide to all employees. On the 
contrary, the Court recognized the RLA allowed contracts to require 
“employees to share the costs of negotiating and administering 
collective agreements, and the costs of the adjustment and settlement 
of disputes” because “fairness justified the spreading of the costs to 
all employees who benefited.”44 
40. Id. at 764.
41. Id. at 758–59.
42. Id. at 760.
43. Id. at 761.
44. Id. at 761, 763–64.
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Third, while the Court read the RLA to prohibit rail unions from 
using money exacted from dissenting employees “to support political 
causes which they oppose,”45 it also recognized that legislation 
restricting the union from using its funds “for the purpose of 
disseminating information as to candidates and programs and 
publicizing the positions of the unions on them . . . would work a 
restraint on the expression of political ideas which might be 
offensive to the First Amendment.”46 Thus, the Court recognized that 
unions did not simply possess statutory rights but also possessed 
constitutional rights under the First Amendment and, moreover, that 
these rights were inextricably connected to the ability of unions to 
fund their political activities. 
The Court extended the regime it invented in Street 
to government workers in 1977 in Abood v. Detroit 
Board of Education.47 Abood arose from a Michigan 
public-sector-labor-relations statute that allowed school districts to 
agree to agency-shop provisions and allowed unions to spend agency 
fees on political activities. The Court held that Michigan could not 
constitutionally allow expenditure of agency fees on political 
activities over the objection of nonunion teachers. Rather, the union 
was entitled to collect and expend agency fees only for purposes 
germane to its role as bargaining representative. Justice Powell’s 
opinion for a unanimous Court explained why unions must be able to 
charge fees for the services they are legally required to provide 
workers: 
The designation of a union as exclusive representative 
carries with it great responsibilities. The tasks of 
negotiating and administering a collective-bargaining 
agreement and representing the interests of employees in 
settling disputes and processing grievances are continuing 
and difficult ones. They often entail expenditure of much 
time and money. The services of lawyers, expert 
negotiators, economists, and a research staff, as well as 
general administrative personnel, may be required. 
Moreover, in carrying out these duties, the union is obliged 
fairly and equitably to represent all employees, union and 
45. Id. at 764.
46. Id. at 773.
47. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
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nonunion, within the relevant unit. A union-shop 
arrangement has been thought to distribute fairly the cost of 
these activities among those who benefit, and it counteracts 
the incentive that employees might otherwise have to 
become “free riders” to refuse to contribute to the union 
while obtaining benefits of union representation that 
necessarily accrue to all employees.48 
Abood was the first case to hold that government employees have a 
First Amendment right to refuse to pay for union political activities, 
but it was also unanimous in holding that employees can be required 
to share the costs of union representational services. Thus, what 
Abood confirmed—and what later cases reiterated—was that 
membership dues potentially implicated the First Amendment but 
that this depended upon the types of activities for which the dues 
were used. Dues spent on collective bargaining and germane 
activities were constitutional because the government had a 
compelling interest in spreading the costs to cover these services. 
However, to compel an employee to subsidize a union’s political 
activities offended the First Amendment. 
After Abood, the Court decided a series of cases distinguishing 
between costs that are chargeable to dissenters and those that are not. 
Many of the cases sparked dissent, as Justices disagreed with one 
another about whether certain union expenses benefitted all members 
of the bargaining unit and should be paid for by all or whether they 
impermissibly allowed the union to spend money on political or 
ideological causes that dissenters opposed. One such case, Lehnert v. 
Ferris Faculty Ass’n,49 is noteworthy for the recognition by the 
entire Court, including Justices who joined the majority opinion in 
Harris, of the reasons why statutes allow unions to charge dissenters 
for the cost of activities germane to its role as bargaining agent. As 
Justice Scalia explained in his concurring and dissenting opinion: 
Our First Amendment jurisprudence . . . recognizes a 
correlation between the rights and the duties of the union, 
on the one hand, and the nonunion members of the 
bargaining unit, on the other. Where the state imposes upon 
the union a duty to deliver services, it may permit the union 
48. Id. at 221–22.
49. 500 U.S. 507 (1991).
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to demand reimbursement for them; or, looked at from the 
other end, where the state creates in the nonmembers a legal 
entitlement from the union, it may compel them to pay the 
cost. The “compelling state interest” that justifies this 
constitutional rule is not simply elimination of the inequity 
arising from the fact that some union activity redounds to 
the benefit of “free-riding” nonmembers; private speech 
often furthers the interests of nonspeakers, and that does not 
alone empower the state to compel the speech to be paid 
for. What is distinctive, however, about the “free riders” 
who are nonunion members of the union’s own bargaining 
unit is that in some respects they are free riders whom the 
law requires the union to carry—indeed, requires the union 
to go out of its way to benefit, even at the expense of its 
other interests. In the context of bargaining, a union must 
seek to further the interests of its nonmembers; it cannot, 
for example, negotiate particularly high wage increases for 
its members in exchange for accepting no increases for 
others. Thus, the free ridership (if it were left to be that) 
would be not incidental but calculated, not imposed by 
circumstances but mandated by government decree.50 
Justice Scalia’s observation that the union’s statutory duty of fair 
representation creates the free rider problem disappeared entirely in 
Harris. 
B. Harris v. Quinn
Harris was brought by NRTW on behalf of a putative class of 
home-care workers who did not wish to be represented by a union. In 
the district court, NRTW described the workers as recipients of 
government benefits and characterized the union’s services as 
lobbying for expenditure of government funds.51 The district court 
dismissed the suit, reasoning that the assistants were state employees, 
50. Id. at 556.
51. Harris v. Quinn, No. 10-cv-02477, 2010 U.S. Dist. WL 4376500, at *7 (N.D. Ill.
Nov. 12, 2010). As the district court explained, “Plaintiffs do not deny that fair share fees in the 
collective bargaining context have been found constitutional. Rather, Plaintiffs argue that the 
exclusive representation arrangement here is ‘nothing short of compulsory political 
representation’ that violates Plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights by compelling them to support a 
state-designated entity for purposes of lobbying the State for additional benefits from a 
government program.” Id. at *6. 
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that the fees were charged for collective bargaining not lobbying, and 
that under Abood and Lehnert, the Illinois law was constitutional.52 
The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding the case to be controlled by 
Abood.53 
In the Supreme Court, the plaintiffs expanded their argument 
from distinguishing the Court’s fair-share-fee jurisprudence to 
attacking it. While they persisted in arguing that home-care workers 
are not government employees and that union representation is akin 
to lobbying over expenditure of government funds, they asked the 
Court not only to strike down the Illinois law but also to overrule 
Abood and make it unconstitutional for any public sector employer to 
agree to contract with an agency-fee provision.54 
The Court did not go that far. Although a substantial portion of 
Justice Alito’s opinion for the five-Justice majority was devoted to 
criticizing Abood, the majority in the end limited its holding to 
home-care workers paid by the state yet selected and supervised by 
private individuals.55 Harris thus leaves undisturbed all state public 
sector labor laws except those governing workers with arrangements 
like the home-care law in Illinois. The holding and reasoning are 
composed of five major propositions. 
First, to make the case for a First Amendment right to refuse to 
pay agency fees, the Court began by criticizing Hanson, Street, and 
Abood for rejecting the First Amendment as a limit on agency fees. 
To do so, the majority faulted these cases’ First Amendment analysis 
and, especially, their reliance on the analogy between agency fees 
and state laws requiring lawyers to join and pay dues to the state bar. 
Acknowledging that in Lathrop v. Donohue56 the Court rejected a 
First Amendment challenge to the integrated bar, Justice Alito 
quoted at length from Justice Douglas’s Lathrop dissent in which he 
complained that requiring lawyers to join the bar gives “carte 
52. Id. at *6–9.
53. Harris v. Quinn, 656 F.3d 692, 699, 701 (7th Cir. 2011).
54. Brief for Petitioner at 1–2, Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014) (No. 11-681), 2014
WL 131659, at *2 (“The time has come to overrule Abood.”). 
55. Harris split along the ideological line that has become familiar. The five Justices
appointed by Republican presidents (Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Scalia, Thomas, 
and Kennedy) ruled the Illinois law unconstitutional; the four appointed by Democrats (Justices 
Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan) dissented.  
56. 367 U.S. 820 (1961).
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blanche to any legislature to put . . . professional people into 
goose-stepping brigades.”57  
Second, the Harris majority criticized the notion that dissenters’ 
First Amendment rights are sufficiently protected by being able to 
resist paying for political activities. Here, Justice Alito’s opinion 
emphasized that in the public sector, everything a union does is 
political.58 The subjects of public sector collective bargaining 
(wages, pensions, and benefits), the majority maintained, “are 
important political issues;”59 “both collective bargaining and political 
advocacy and lobbying are directed at the government”60 and the line 
between these activities, for which employees must pay, and political 
activities is difficult to draw.61 Therefore, the division between 
chargeable and nonchargeable expenses is illusory because one 
cannot distinguish between “nonpolitical” and “political” union 
activities and expenditures. 
Third, although the majority criticized Abood, apparently there 
were not enough votes to overrule it. So the majority held only that 
home-care workers paid by Medicaid, whom the majority variously 
termed “partial-public employees,” “quasi-public employees,” or 
“not full-fledged public employees,”62 have a First Amendment right 
to refuse to pay agency fees. Justice Alito emphasized all the ways in 
which these workers were not like other government employees: they 
are selected by the recipient of care, not by the government; the 
recipient of care approves—along with the state agency, though the 
majority does not mention this—the service plan defining the job 
duties; and the state and the recipient of care jointly control the 
annual review of the care provider’s job performance. Additionally, 
Illinois home-care workers do not participate in the state employees’ 
retirement and health benefit plans but in the union’s plans with 
funding contributed by the state, and they are ineligible to participate 
in other state employee programs, including those covering job 
sharing, banking, sharing sick leave and vacation time, and 
57. Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2629 (2014) (quoting Lathrop, 367 U.S. at 885
(Douglas, J., dissenting)). 
58. Id. at 2632.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 2632–33.
61. Id. at 2633.
62. Id.
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behavioral health programs.63 Finally, the government disclaims tort 
liability for the acts of home-care workers and therefore excludes 
them from the protections of the indemnification law.64 
Under Illinois law, however, home-care workers are public 
employees. And as Justice Kagan pointed out in her dissent, 
home-care workers in programs structured like Illinois’s are treated 
by the United States Department of Labor as joint employees of the 
state and the care recipient.65 They are paid entirely through 
government funds and the state regulates a number of aspects of 
eligibility for, and conditions of employment as, a home-care worker. 
In rejecting Illinois’s determination that home-care workers are state 
employees as a matter of state law, then, the Court ignored its usual 
rule that it does not decide state law questions. Other than home-care 
workers in Illinois, moreover, it is not clear which workers fall into 
this new category of workers exempt from Abood, which makes this 
one of the most puzzling parts of the Court’s opinion. 
There are two additional puzzling aspects of this step in the 
Court’s reasoning. First, what is the line between full-fledged 
government employees (who do not have First Amendment rights to 
resist agency-fee provisions) and “quasi-public employees” who 
have the Harris right? The majority never explained why the 
coverage of these myriad Illinois laws is relevant to the question 
whether different types of state employees should have different First 
Amendment rights. Whether they can participate in the state 
job-sharing program, or whether they get health care from a program 
funded by the state but administered by SEIU as opposed to one 
funded by the state and administered by the state’s chosen plan 
administrator, has nothing to do with whether employees should have 
a First Amendment right to resist paying fair-share fees. And it is 
ironic that the Court granted greater First Amendment rights to a 
category of government workers they described as less 
“full-fledged,” while simultaneously attacking collective bargaining 
by these workers for being more political than the bargaining 
approved in Abood. 
At a more practical level, the absence of any logic behind the 
reasons the majority gives for finding home-care workers not to be 
63. Id. at 2634–35.
64. Id. at 2635.
65. Id. at 2646 n.1 (Kagan, J., dissenting); 78 Fed. Reg. 60483–84 (Oct. 1, 2013).
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state employees makes it difficult for states to respond to the 
decision. How many of the programs identified by the majority 
would Illinois have to extend to home-care workers in order to bring 
them back into the usual rule for agency fees? The uncertain 
implications of this decision are further illuminated by focusing on 
state employees other than home-care workers. If some state 
employees are excluded from, say, the State Employee Vacation 
Time Act or the State Employee Health Savings Account Law, but 
are covered by the State Employee Job Sharing Act and by the State 
Employee Indemnification Act, do they have the enhanced First 
Amendment rights of home-care workers or the same First 
Amendment rights as state troopers, park rangers, or DMV clerks? 
Because the majority never explained why the coverage of these 
Illinois laws is relevant to the issue in the case, it provided no basis 
for Illinois lawyers and legislators to figure out how to respond, nor 
any basis for determining what other states’ labor relations laws 
might be vulnerable to a Harris-type challenge. 
The fourth point in the majority’s analysis was its effort to 
distinguish the speech rights of home-care workers from those of 
government employees generally. Under Garcetti v. Ceballos,66 
government employees have no First Amendment protection for their 
speech on the job and in the scope of employment.67 And under 
Pickering v. Board of Education,68 government employees have a 
right to comment off the job “as a citizen” on matters of public 
concern only when this right is not outweighed by “the interest of the 
state, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public 
services it performs through its employees.”69 The Harris majority 
did not discuss Garcetti, only mentioning the case in a footnote.70 
66. 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
67. Id.
68. 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). Garcetti involved a deputy district attorney who was
disciplined for writing a memo to his supervisor complaining about the office’s handling of 
evidence and police testimony. Pickering involved a teacher who wrote a letter to the local 
newspaper critiquing the way in which the school board had handled raising revenue for the 
district’s schools. The United States and Justice Kagan’s dissent both argued that bargaining over 
terms and conditions of employment is unprotected under Garcetti because it concerns working 
conditions. Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2653–54 (Kagan, J., dissenting). If the Deputy District Attorney 
in Garcetti had no First Amendment protection against discipline for writing a memorandum to 
his supervisor, so, too, employees should have no heightened First Amendment protection for 
refusing to pay fees to a union to bargain on their behalf on all of those topics. 
69. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
70. Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2642.
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Pickering did not apply to home-care workers, the majority claimed, 
because “the State [i]s not acting in a traditional employer role.”71 If 
Pickering did apply, the Court asserted that the home-care workers’ 
First Amendment rights outweighed the government’s interests.72 
Ironically, therefore, quasi-government employees have a robust 
First Amendment right to refuse to pay agency fees while they have 
no First Amendment right to engage in other on-the-job speech.  
The final major conceptual step in the Harris majority opinion is 
an empirical claim: in Justice Alito’s view, agency-fee contracts are 
not necessary for public sector collective bargaining to work, at least 
in relation to this category of workers.73 In the majority’s view, 
agency fees are unnecessary because state law limits the scope of 
bargaining to the terms within the State’s control, and many 
conditions of employment are set by the recipient of services, not the 
state.74 Additionally, the union is not responsible for handling very 
many grievances because the statutorily required grievance 
procedure “appears to relate solely to any grievance that a personal 
assistant may have with the State.”75 
This is the heart of the Court’s response to the free-rider 
argument in Harris: the subjects of bargaining and the grievance 
procedure are limited, so the union’s obligations to nonpayers are 
also limited, so collective bargaining isn’t truly necessary to protect 
workers, so unions do not need to collect fees from dissenters in 
order to achieve whatever benefits unionization provides. The 
majority opinion phrased this point in terms of a burden of proof that 
the union had not sustained: an agency-fee provision “cannot be 
sustained unless the cited benefits for personal assistants could not 
have been achieved if the union had been required to depend for 
funding on the dues paid by those personal assistants who chose to 
join. No such showing has been made.”76 Although Justice Alito 
noted various improvements in wages, working conditions, and 
training attained through unionization, he speculated that unions 
need not collect fees from nonmembers to achieve these benefits 
because members’ dues were sufficient. Justice Alito also speculated 
71. Id.
72. Id. at 2643.
73. Id. at 2636 (majority opinion).
74. Id. at 2636.
75. Id. at 2637.
76. Id. at 2641.
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that unions are no different from organizations that depend on 
voluntary contributions to advocate on behalf of occupational 
groups.77  
Justice Alito’s contention that agency fees are unnecessary for 
collective bargaining to operate for Illinois home-care workers (as 
opposed to teacher, as in Abood and Lehnert, or all other forms of 
government employment) has all sorts of problems as a form of 
constitutional analysis. In the first place, the majority does not 
explain when the responsibilities of a government employee union 
would be sufficiently great as to justify a contract requiring 
nonmembers to pay fair share fees. Second, Harris is in tension with 
Justice Scalia’s opinion in Lehnert, which argued that the free-rider 
problem is more acute for unions than for other organizations, 
because only unions have a legal duty of fair representation to all 
employees.78 Most important, whether agency-fee provisions are 
necessary to an effective labor relations regime is, as Justice Alito 
explained, fundamentally an empirical issue.79 Justice Kagan’s 
dissent disputed the majority’s speculation about the empirics, 
including the nature and extent of the union’s burdens in providing 
services to nonpaying workers. Union advocates, for example, point 
to the fact that union density and wages are lower in right-to-work 
states than in states in which unions can charge agency fees. Scholars 
have attributed the difference in union density between Canada and 
the United States—especially the sharper decline in union density in 
the United States as compared to Canada—to right-to-work laws.80 
Reasonable minds have been differing for a century on the 
question of whether collective bargaining improves productivity, 
wages, or working conditions, and whether some form of agency-fee 
provision is necessary to make the entire architecture of labor 
relations run. Advocates of judicial restraint would argue that the 
majority was wrong to arrogate to itself the responsibility for 
deciding what kinds of contract provisions are necessary for state 
77. Id.
78. Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass’n, 500 U.S. 507, 556 (1991).
79. Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2634.
80. Daphne Gottlieb Taras & Allen Ponak, Mandatory Agency Shop Laws as an Explanation
of Canada-U.S. Union Density Divergence, 22 J. LAB. RES. 541 (2001) (finding that mandatory 
agency-shop laws in Canada and spread of right-to-work laws in the United States may explain 
why U.S. union density, which was similar to Canada until 1960s, fell more sharply than in 
Canada). 
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agencies to effectively manage the state labor force. The majority’s 
unsupported empirical claims that free riding is not a major problem 
and that unions do not need agency fees in order to effectively 
represent home-care workers are also suspect. Advocates of an 
activist and pragmatic federal judiciary would perhaps find nothing 
amiss in the Court determining whether particular regulatory regimes 
are necessary or desirable, although they might want more 
engagement with the empirical studies on whether agency fees are 
necessary to enable unions to operate effectively. And of course 
disputants over federalism might line up over this one too. One side 
might complain that the Court gave too little respect to the Illinois 
government’s judgments about how to manage its own workforce; 
the other might celebrate the Court’s protection of the First 
Amendment rights of state workers. But what is amusing about 
Harris is that it is the Republican-appointed Justices who are both 
activist and anti-state’s rights here, substituting their policy views 
about the importance of certain labor contract terms for those of the 
Illinois legislature and governor about a matter of state governance. 
The majority in Harris departed from the view that has prevailed 
since 1937, when the Court abandoned substantive due process 
jurisprudence and upheld the NLRA against exactly the kind of 
challenges as were made in this case—that it limited the freedom of 
nonunion workers and was unnecessary to protect labor relations.81 
The doctrinal difference is that then it was the Due Process Clause 
that was the basis for invalidating labor legislation; here it is the First 
Amendment. 
III. AGENCY FEES ARE NOT COMPELLED SPEECH
A. The Flaws in the Compelled Speech Analysis of Agency Fees
The five steps in the majority’s reasoning outlined above rest on
a fundamental flaw: the Court sees a First Amendment violation 
where there should be none. Contractually required fees for union 
representational services are not speech. Payment of fees for services 
is just that: purchasing a service.82 It is a form of conduct, like giving 
81. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
82. As Robert Post pointed out in an article criticizing the incoherence in the Court’s cases
on compelled subsidies for speech, if any compelled requirement to pay for services involving 
speech raises a First Amendment issue, then the First Amendment is implicated by statutes 
requiring litigants to pay their opponents’ attorneys’ fees, permitting registration of automobiles 
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someone a twenty-dollar bill. Writing a check or authorizing a credit 
card transaction or payroll deduction for the same twenty-dollar bill 
involves speech (writing, typing, or clicking a box), but the operative 
part of the transaction is conduct—transfer of funds—not speech. 
This action has no more expressive content than does compulsory 
payment of library fines, taxes, homeowners’ association dues, 
insurance premiums, or utility bills—all of which the recipient will 
use to fund a variety of speech and other activities. 
There are, of course, circumstances when giving someone 
money is expressive because the donor intends it as an endorsement 
of someone’s views and gives money in order for those views to be 
propagated widely, as when one contributes to a political campaign 
or to an organization like the ACLU or the NRA. But when the 
payment is compulsory, it loses its expressive aspect. If a political 
candidate extorts money from someone, the payment sends no 
message of endorsement or the desire to support speech. When a 
pacifist and death penalty opponent pays her taxes knowing some 
part of them will be used by generals to promote war and by 
prosecutors to advocate the death penalty, she does not endorse war 
or the death penalty. And when a lawyer pays her state bar dues, she 
conveys no message about the content or enforcement of the state bar 
ethics rules or its administration of the admission and discipline 
system. 
Even though compulsory payments are not themselves 
expressive conduct, they might still raise First Amendment issues 
because they compel a person to subsidize another’s speech. Whether 
compulsory financial support for another’s expressive activity 
violates the First Amendment is a difficult issue because it involves 
the unwilling donor’s speech rights, the recipient’s own free speech 
rights, and the viability of regulatory regimes that have nothing to do 
with speech.83 Living in a community requires financial support of 
only if mechanics have certified they meet emissions standards, allowing children to enroll in 
public school only if physicians certify they have been immunized against diseases, or requiring 
publicly owned corporations to pay for financial reports of independent accountants. Robert Post, 
Compelled Subsidization of Speech: Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Association, 2005 SUP. CT. 
REV. 195, 211–12; see also Robert Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A First Amendment 
Analysis of Compelled Physician Speech, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 939, 942–43 (discussing the 
compelled speech issues raised by a South Dakota statute requiring physicians performing 
abortions to first inform the patient that she is terminating the life of “a whole, separate, unique, 
living human being” and that abortion may cause a significant risk of psychological trauma). 
83. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
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organizations that may spend money on speech activities as well as 
other services that have little or nothing to do with expressive 
conduct. Many live in neighborhoods or condominium complexes 
and are compelled to pay homeowners’ association dues that are 
spent on speech activities as well as on non-expressive activities like 
landscaping. We all pay taxes that support, among other things, 
libraries, schools, and other programs that engage in speech activities 
we may abhor. Government employees contribute to health and 
retirement insurance programs, which spend on expressive activity. 
The community typically has a much greater interest in requiring 
financial support of organizations that provide collective goods than 
it does in forcing anybody to speak. 
In a long series of cases, the Supreme Court has struggled to 
articulate rules governing which uses of compelled financial 
contributions or property violate the First Amendment rights of 
unwilling donors or property owners and when the rights of the 
collective to speak outweigh the rights of the individual to object.84 
The Court has sometimes upheld mandatory fees finding that they do 
not involve any compelled speech. It upheld student activity fees at 
public universities in Board of Regents of the University of 
Wisconsin System v. Southworth.85 The Court held that such a fee 
was constitutional, even when some funds were spent on political 
speech, so long as the university distributed the funds in a 
viewpoint-neutral manner.86 In Keller v. State Bar of California,87 
the Court said that the Bar could use compulsory dues only if the 
dues were “reasonably incurred for the purpose of regulating the 
legal profession, including operating the disciplinary system, or 
‘improving the quality of the legal service available to the people of 
the State.’”88 In Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott,89 the Court 
upheld federal regulations that required fruit producers to contribute 
funds to pay for generic advertising for fruit.90 In all of these cases, 
the compelled subsidy was for speech as well as other services and 
84. See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 8.
85. 529 U.S. 217 (2000).
86. Id. at 233–34.
87. 496 U.S. 1 (1990).
88. Id. at 14 (citing Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 843 (1961)).
89. Glickman v. Wileman Bros., 521 U.S. 457 (1997).
90. Id.
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activities. And, as the Court remarked in Glickman, in none of them 
did the assessments “engender any crisis of conscience.”91 
In cases that the Court found a compulsory payment to violate 
the First Amendment, the Court found the subsidy for speech to be 
unrelated to other regulatory or community goals or to present a risk 
that the audience might erroneously attribute the message to the 
unwilling donor. United States v. United Foods, Inc.,92 decided four 
years after Glickman,93 invalidated mandatory assessments for 
generic product advertising of mushrooms, finding the compelled 
subsidy to be separable from the regulation of mushrooms.94 Other 
cases found compelled speech where the government required 
someone to make his or her property or resources available to a 
speaker when there was a risk that the audience would attribute the 
speaker’s message to the unwilling donor. Thus, in Miami Herald 
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,95 the Court invalidated a state law that 
required newspapers to provide space to political candidates who had 
been verbally attacked in print.96 And in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 
v. Public Utilities Commission of California,97 the Court invalidated
a regulation that required a private utility company to include in its
billing envelopes materials prepared by a public interest group.98
But where there is little risk that people will erroneously 
attribute the message to the entity required to allow the speaker to 
use its property, the Court has rejected the compelled speech 
argument. In Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic Institutional Rights, 
Inc.,99 the Court held that the Solomon Amendment, which required 
universities receiving federal funds to open their premises to military 
recruiters, did not involve compelled speech because it “neither 
limits what law schools may say nor requires them to say anything” 
but leaves them “free . . . to express whatever views they may have 
91. Id. at 472.
92. 533 U.S. 405 (2001).
93. Id. at 408.
94. Id. Justice Kennedy distinguished Glickman on the ground that “the mandated
assessments for speech were ancillary to a more comprehensive program restricting marketing 
autonomy” and California tree fruit producers were constrained in other aspects of their 
marketing, but no similar restrictions applied to mushroom producers who were not bound by the 
statute to “associate as a group which makes cooperative decisions.” Id. at 411, 413. 
95. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
96. Id. at 256–58.
97. 475 U.S. 1 (1986).
98. Id. at 20–21.
99. 547 U.S. 47 (2006).
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on the military’s congressionally mandated employment policy, all 
the while retaining eligibility for federal funds.”100 Similarly, in 
PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins,101 the Court held that a state 
constitution requiring shopping center owners to allow protesters to 
speak on their premises did not compel speech: “The views 
expressed by members of the public in passing out pamphlets or 
seeking signatures for a petition . . . will not likely be identified with 
those of the owner.”102 Moreover, the Court said that “no specific 
message is dictated by the State to be displayed on appellants’ 
property. . . . [A]ppellants can expressly disavow any connection 
with the message by simply posting signs in the area where the 
speakers or handbillers stand.”103 
In most of the cases addressing when mandatory payments 
constitute compelled speech, the Court has explored the extent to 
which the payments are part of a larger system for regulating 
conduct. One example of this, as we noted above, is the majority’s 
analysis of mandatory assessments in United Foods. There, Justice 
Kennedy emphasized that the mandatory assessments upheld in 
Glickman to promote fruits “were ancillary to a more comprehensive 
program restricting marketing autonomy” and that the regime bound 
growers into “a group which makes cooperative decisions,” but that 
the mushroom assessments were not.104 Similarly, in Southworth, the 
Court emphasized the diversity of uses to which student activity fees 
were put in the context of the intellectual environment a university 
seeks to create.105 And, of course, Street and Abood emphasized that 
agency-fee requirements facilitated a comprehensive statute creating 
self-governance in labor relations.  
B. The Communitarian Argument for Compelled Fees
Communitarian activities always involve a balance of the rights 
of the community and the rights of the individual. A community 
100. Id. at 60.
101. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
102. Id. at 87.
103. Id.
104. United States v. United Foods, 533 U.S. 405, 406 (2001). The Court relied on United
Foods in Knox v. Service Employees International Union when it observed that compulsory fees 
are permissible when they are “a ‘necessary incident’ of the larger regulatory purpose which 
justified the required association.” Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 
2289 (2012) (quoting United Foods, 533 U.S. at 415). 
105. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 217 (2000).
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organization requires financial support, and usually some of the 
money it receives will be spent on speech activities. As Professor 
Brishen Rogers has pointed out, protecting the right of positive 
association in society will always pose the risk that people who are 
swept up in the organization or wish to belong to it for some 
purposes but not others will have to put up with certain speech with 
which they disagree.106 
The Supreme Court has long recognized that the community 
typically has a much greater interest in requiring financial support of 
organizations that provide collective goods than it does in forcing 
anybody to speak. This underlies the distinction the Court has drawn 
between government speech and private speech: when the 
government speaks (as the community does when it funds libraries) 
or when the government funds private entities to provide services 
that involve expressive activity (as it does when it funds legal 
services organizations or health care programs), the Court has held 
that its choice of message does not violate the First Amendment 
rights of those who fund the speech or those private entities that 
receive funds for purpose of speech.107 In yet another agricultural 
advertising case, Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass’n,108 the Court 
upheld a requirement that cattle producers pay a fee that was used by 
the Beef Board, a group of beef producers appointed pursuant to a 
federal law, to promote the sale of beef.109 Justice Scalia rejected the 
First Amendment challenge brought by dissenting beef producers, 
finding the subsidy to be analogous to taxes that fund government 
speech and emphasizing the importance of allowing the government 
to speak.110 
106. Brishen Rogers, Three Liberal Concepts of Workplace Freedom of Association, BERK. J.
EMP. & LAB. L. (forthcoming 2015), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=2608034. 
107. See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 548 (2001) (stating that where
private speech is involved, even Congress’ antecedent funding decision cannot be aimed at the 
suppression of ideas thought inimical to the Government’s own interest); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 
U.S. 173, 193 (1991) (stating that the Government does not violate the Constitution when it 
selectively funds a program to encourage certain activities it believes to be in the public interest, 
without at the same time funding an alternative program which seeks to deal with the problem in 
another way). 
108. 544 U.S. 550 (2005).
109. Id. at 564–65.
110. Id. at 561 (quoting 7 U.S.C. §§ 2901(b), 2902(13) (2012); 7 C.F.R. § 1260.169(d)
(2004)). 
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The concurring and dissenting opinions in Johanns, as well as 
the scholarly commentary, noted that the majority had not 
satisfactorily explained how the mushroom advertising regime struck 
down as compelled speech in United Foods differed from the beef 
advertising found to be government speech in Johanns.111 The more 
significant problem for the Court’s analysis was not identified in that 
case: how does a statute and regulations appointing a private 
organization to speak in general terms about beef differ from a 
statute and regulations appointing a private organization (a union) to 
speak in general terms about wages, hours, and other conditions of 
employment in a bargaining unit? If government involvement in 
appointment of the organization, a law compelling financial 
contribution, and general statutory guidelines about the topics of 
speech make the advertising in Johanns government speech, it would 
seem that government certification of a union as the exclusive 
bargaining representative and regulation of the subjects of bargaining 
would make bargaining government speech in the public sector. 
The significance of Johanns for us is not that collective 
bargaining is government speech, but rather that the Court 
recognized in Johanns that communities routinely rely on compelled 
financial support of private organizations to achieve regulatory goals 
and that the Court in some cases recognizes the importance of 
allowing the community to do so. As Professor Cynthia Estlund has 
noted, unions are one of a number of private organizations that are 
empowered by law to play a social and economic role in regulatory 
regimes that rely on private organizations to provide collective 
goods. Examples include not only labor unions and the various 
agricultural marketing organizations at issue in United Foods and 
Johanns, but also public utilities. As Professor Estlund explained at 
some length, unions are different, but the power they have to agree 
with employers that employees must pay fees for services the union 
provides is not as anomalous as the Harris majority suggests. Indeed, 
the anomaly might be that unions in right-to-work states (unlike 
public utilities, for example) are required to provide services for free. 
One might argue that the duty of fair representation does not impose 
111. Post, supra note 82, at 197 (arguing that the fundamental premise of the Court’s
compelled subsidization of speech doctrine is flawed and it is “simply not true that First 
Amendment concerns are implicated whenever persons are required to subsidize speech with 
which they disagree”). 
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entirely uncompensated obligations on unions and their members 
because the right of exclusive representation gives the majority an 
off-setting benefit, and that the obligation to provide services to 
free-riders is the quid pro quo for the union’s power of exclusive 
representation. Professor Estlund has explored this argument 
thoughtfully and at length, and has shown that all regulatory regimes 
that impose significant responsibilities on private organizations allow 
the organizations to charge all service recipients. The public utility’s 
special monopoly position, for example, is not regarded as sufficient 
compensation for the gas or electric service it must provide to every 
household.112   
In Harris, the state of Illinois chose to rely on a partnership 
between the state agency and the union to develop standards and 
processes to ensure quality service in the government-funded 
home-care sector, believing it would improve the lives of both 
patients and care providers. The state could fund the union’s 
operations directly through tax revenue, which would raise no First 
Amendment issue, or it could empower the union to fund it through 
compulsory fees. Either way, compulsory payments fund a 
regulatory regime that involves expressive activities. In Johanns, the 
Court acknowledged the government’s own interests in achieving its 
regulatory goal—the promotion of beef production and consumption. 
This is the same point the Court emphasized in Street.113 Congress 
chose to regulate labor relations by relying on private entities (in that 
case railroads and the unions representing employees) to develop and 
administer a regulatory regime ensuring safe and efficient 
transportation with minimal service interruptions and with adequate 
working conditions. As noted above, the Court recognized this 
regulatory framework imposed considerable expense on the private 
organizations and it allowed the unions to charge workers for the 
cost of running it, just as the Beef Board can charge producers for the 
cost of maintaining that regulatory regime.114 Similarly, in Harris, 
Illinois chose to rely on the union to administer certain aspects of the 
112. See generally Cynthia Estlund, Are Unions a Constitutional Anomaly? (N.Y.U. Sch. of
Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 15-01, Jan. 12, 2015), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2548748.  
113. Johanns, 544 U.S. at 560–61; Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 760–61
(1961). 
114. Street, 367 U.S. at 760.
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regulatory regime governing home-care workers and the health 
insurance plan for them.115 
The Court’s elemental mistake in its compelled speech 
jurisprudence was to extend the rule from cases where the 
government actually was trying to compel speech—as in West 
Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette,116 which invalidated a 
compulsory flag salute law117—to cases involving the requirement to 
pay money. As shown above, the cases involving compelled 
financial support are difficult to reconcile, but laws that include 
financial support as an integral part of a regulatory regime much 
broader than promoting speech tend to be upheld. 
One final aspect of compelled expenditures requires attention: 
even if compelled financial support does not violate the First 
Amendment’s Free Speech Clause, does the mere fact of giving 
money to an organization make the donor complicit in the 
organization’s activities and, if so, does the complicity give the 
dissenter a First Amendment right to opt out? The Court has 
generally (but not consistently) held that compelled payments to an 
organization that acts in ways one opposes does not violate the Free 
Speech Clause of the First Amendment, and until the summer of 
2014 when the Court decided Burwell v. Hobby Lobby,118 it had also 
rejected arguments that compelled financial support violated the Free 
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.119 However, in Hobby 
Lobby, the Court held that compelled financial contributions may 
substantially burden religious exercise if the recipient uses some part 
of the money to fund conduct that the donor finds religiously 
objectionable. 
That case considered the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act’s requirement that employers fund health insurance benefits and 
whether this provision violated the statutory free exercise rights of 
owners of a corporation when they insisted that paying money to a 
115. Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2624–25 (2014).
116. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
117. Id. at 642.
118. 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
119. There is a vast literature on compelled financial support and claims of freedom of
conscience and speech, and a number of the arguments we present here are essayed in different 
contexts at greater length there. See, e.g., Micah Schwartzman, Conscience, Speech and Money, 
97 VA. L. REV. 317, 372–82 (2011) (exploring the contentions that money is not conscience, 
association, or speech). 
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health insurance plan contravened their religious beliefs if the plan 
covered contraceptive methods the owners thought would destroy 
human embryos.120 In earlier cases, the Court rejected the argument 
that compelled payments substantially burden religious exercise, 
thus, for example, rejecting a claim by Amish businessmen that 
paying Social Security taxes violated their religion.121 In Hobby 
Lobby, the Court distinguished two cases in which taxpayers 
objected to government subsidies to religious organizations, pointing 
out that in both cases the financial support was not alleged to violate 
the taxpayers’ religious beliefs, only their beliefs about proper 
church-state relations.122 It would take another article to sort out the 
difference between the complicity argument that prevailed in Hobby 
Lobby and those in the compelled speech cases and in the other cases 
in which the Court has rejected the contention that compelled 
financial support makes one complicit in another’s conduct that the 
individual finds morally repugnant. For present purposes it is 
sufficient to note that the Court has never accepted the notion that 
financial support always or even usually equals complicity sufficient 
to establish a free speech violation. 
Moreover, as we argue in Part IV, even if the majority is right 
that paying fees is a form of compelled speech, then the majority’s 
requirement that union members subsidize contract negotiation and 
administration for their free-riding co-workers is equally compelled 
speech of the union and its members. As we explain below, on the 
Court’s analysis, unions and their members’ First Amendment rights 
are implicated when laws require unions to provide services to 
nonpaying nonmembers. 
IV. WHEN IT’S NOT “OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY”: THE FIRST
AMENDMENT RIGHTS OF UNIONS AND UNION MEMBERS
The heart of the argument that unions violate employees’ rights 
when they spend fees and dues on expressive activity is that the 
unions are spending the employees’ money rather than the union’s. 
120. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2778–79. It is important to note that the free exercise rights
at issue in Hobby Lobby were those protected by statute (the Religious Freedom Restoration Act); 
the case did not decide whether the insurance subsidies violated the corporations’ First 
Amendment rights. 
121. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982).
122. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2779 (citing Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 689 (1971);
Bd. of Educ. of Cent. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 248–49 (1968)). 
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This is fundamentally false. Like insurance companies, homeowners’ 
associations, and other organizations, unions pool money contributed 
by many stakeholders and spend it to provide services and to engage 
in expressive activity. When they do so, they advance the interests of 
the entity and its stakeholders who support the action, and, 
sometimes, they thwart the interests of stakeholders who oppose it. 
But a full First Amendment analysis of the issues must consider the 
interests of the entity and its members as well as the interests of 
those who contribute to the union but oppose the action in question. 
Harris and the fee-objector cases that preceded it consider only 
one set of First Amendment interests: the speech and associational 
rights of dissenters who object to paying dues or special assessment 
fees that might subsidize a union’s political activities. The Court has 
not examined the competing First Amendment interests of unions 
and union members to engage in these political activities. The 
Court’s expansion of First Amendment protection for corporate 
speech and rights of “expressive association” for other groups 
necessitates a re-assessment of the speech rights of unions in the 
context of fee objections. 
The Court has assessed the constitutionality of agency-fee 
agreements in relation to the First Amendment rights of dissenters on 
the one hand, and Congress’s interest in combatting free riders and 
promoting labor peace through its adoption of federal labor statutes 
on the other.123 But this skews the balance of rights because it 
considers only one side—the objectors—to have First Amendment 
rights while portraying the other side as having only a statutory 
interest in avoiding free riding.124 As we explain below, unions enjoy 
123. See Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2643 (2014) (“Agency-fee provisions
unquestionably impose a heavy burden on the First Amendment interests of objecting employees. 
And on the other side of the balance, the arguments on which the United States relies—relating to 
the promotion of labor peace and the problem of free riders—have already been discussed.” 
(internal citations omitted)). 
124. Justice Alito’s majority opinion in Knox proves illustrative here. Rebuking the Ninth
Circuit for suggesting that the Supreme Court had “call[ed] for a balancing of the ‘right’ of the 
union to collect an agency fee against the First Amendment rights of nonmembers,” Justice Alito 
reiterated the point first raised in Davenport that “unions have no constitutional entitlement to the 
fees of nonmember-employees.” Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 
2291 (2012) (internal citations omitted). He then stated that “[a] union’s ‘collection of fees from 
nonmembers is authorized by an act of legislative grace,’—one that we have termed ‘unusual’ 
and ‘extraordinary.’ Far from calling for a balancing of rights or interests . . . exacting fees from 
unwilling contributors must be ‘carefully tailored to minimize the infringement’ of free speech 
rights. And to underscore the meaning of this careful tailoring . . . [the] measures burdening the 
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First Amendment protection as expressive associations. Moreover, to 
the extent that union dues are speech, union members also possess 
strong First Amendment claims in relation to their dues being used to 
subsidize free riders. If the First Amendment is going to be deployed 
as a limit on union speech it must also be considered in defense of 
union speech. The ability of unions to raise and spend money to 
advance the interests of workers is core First Amendment activity.125 
When the Court interprets the duty of fair representation to require 
unions to expend money to promote the working conditions of those 
who have a right to refuse to pay, it impinges upon the union’s First 
Amendment rights and does so in a way that is not sufficiently 
narrowly tailored. 
A. The First Amendment Rights of Unions: Recognized
and Then Forgotten 
The Court has long recognized that unions possess First 
Amendment rights and that these rights are inextricably linked to a 
union’s ability to collect and spend member dues.126 Perhaps the 
earliest instance was in 1949 in Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. 
Northwestern Iron and Metal Co.,127 a case involving the legality of 
a “closed-shop” agreement. Unions and union members collectively 
challenged a North Carolina statute and Nebraska constitutional 
amendment that prohibited employers from denying employment 
opportunities based on union membership. They alleged that these 
laws violated their “right of freedom of speech, of assembly and of 
petition guaranteed unions and their members by ‘the First 
Amendment and protected against invasion by the state under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.’”128 The Court rejected the contention on 
the ground that a closed shop was not “indispensable to the right of 
self organization . . . [and] to achievement of sufficient union 
freedom of speech or association must serve a ‘compelling interest’ and must not be significantly 
broader than necessary to serve that interest.” Id. (internal citations omitted).  
125. See Brian Olney, Note, Paycheck Protection or Paycheck Deception? When Government
“Subsidies” Silence Political Speech, 4 U.C. IRV. L. REV. 882 (2014) (noting that union political 
activity is essential to their mission of protecting working and middle class people’s interests and 
voice in the political process and discussing the First Amendment right of workers to raise money 
through payroll deduction). 
126. As many have observed, the Court has paid less attention in recent years to these rights,
focusing instead on the rights of dissenters. See, e.g., Garden, supra note 8, at 32–39. 
127. 335 U.S. 525, 527–37 (1949).
128. Id. at 528–29.
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membership to put unions and employers on a full equality for 
collective bargaining,”129 and was not an essential “‘concomitant’ of 
‘the right of employees to assemble into and associate together 
through labor organizations.’”130 Nevertheless, in recognizing that 
the closed shop did not infringe these rights, the Court assumed that 
unions and union members had a constitutional and not just statutory 
right to assemble and organize to improve their working 
conditions.131 
In Street, the Court explicitly recognized that unions and union 
members possessed First Amendment rights as unions and union 
members. While the Court spoke at great length about safeguarding 
the rights of dissenting employees who objected to their dues being 
used for political purposes, it also rejected an injunction as a remedy 
on the grounds that it would substantially impinge a union and the 
majority of its members from engaging in a variety of political 
activities: 
[M]any of the expenditures involved in the present case are
made for the purpose of disseminating information as to
candidates and programs and publicizing the positions of
the unions on them. As to such expenditures an injunction
would work a restraint on the expression of political ideas
which might be offensive to the First Amendment. For the
majority also has an interest in stating its views without
being silenced by the dissenters.132
In Street, therefore, the Court recognized that laws restricting the 
ability of a group to spend money in the name of protecting the 
speech rights of dissenters also restricts the speech of the majority.133 
Yet, in the years following Street, any sense of unions or their 
members possessing constitutional rights disappeared. Rather, in the 
context of challenges to union security agreements, the Court 
129. Id. at 530.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 531 (“The constitutional right of workers to assemble, to discuss and formulate
plans for furthering their own self interest in jobs cannot be construed as a constitutional 
guarantee that none shall get and hold jobs except those who will join in the assembly or will 
agree to abide by the assembly’s plans.”). 
132. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 773 (1961).
133. See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 8, at 1035 (stating that the Court recognized that
protecting dissenters within the entity does not justify restricting the First Amendment rights of 
the entity to spend money because it gives the government power to restrict the speech activities 
of the entity). 
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developed a body of case law attentive to the First Amendment rights 
of dissenters only. These rights were persistently and precariously 
balanced against unions’ statutory rights and Congress’ desire to 
promote labor peace through its adoption of this statutory scheme. 
Nowhere is this more evident than in Harris where Justice Alito, 
reiterating sentiments he had last raised in Knox v. Service
Employees International Union,134 stated that “‘preventing 
nonmembers from free-riding on the union’s efforts’ is a rationale 
‘generally insufficient to overcome First Amendment objections,’ 
and in this respect, Abood is ‘something of an anomaly.’”135 What 
made Abood anomalous was that Congress had through statute 
essentially overridden First Amendment claims of the highest degree. 
However, had Justice Alito factored in the First Amendment rights of 
unions or union members, Abood might still evoke animosity but it 
would surely not be treated as an anomaly. 
The only additional union dues case where the Court implicitly 
acknowledged that unions might possess First Amendment rights in 
regard to their membership dues was Davenport v. Washington 
Educational Ass’n.136 In Davenport, a public sector union 
representing Washington’s public educational employees was sued 
by the State and by nonmembers who charged the union with 
violating a provision of the Fair Campaign Practices Act, a state 
initiative approved by Washington voters in 1992 that prohibited 
unions from “mak[ing] contributions or expenditures to influence an 
election or to operate a political committee, unless affirmatively 
authorized by [nonmembers].”137 The Washington Supreme Court 
held that the initiative “upset[] the balance of members’ and 
nonmembers’ rights” and violated the First Amendment because it 
“impermissibly shift[ed] to the union the burden of the nonmembers’ 
rights,” which had “the practical effect of inhibiting one group’s 
political speech (the union and supporting nonmembers) for the 
improper purpose of increasing the speech of another group (the 
dissenting nonmembers).”138 The Court expressly connected the 
“weight of the administrative burden” that the initiative imposed on 
134. 132 S. Ct. 2277 (2012).
135. Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2621 (2014) (quoting Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2289 (2012)).
136. Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass’n, 551 U.S. 177, 190 (2007).
137. Id. at 182.
138. State ex rel. Wash. State Pub. Disclosure Comm’n v. Wash. Educ. Ass’n, 130 P.3d 352,
359 (Wash. 2006). 
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the union with the ability of union members to assert their “collective 
political voice.”139 Additionally, the Court stated that the initiative’s 
opt-in requirement, in regulating “the relationship between the union 
and agency-fee payers with regard to political activity,”140 
undermined the unions’ expressive associational rights pursuant to 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Boy Scouts v. Dale.141 
In a 9–0 opinion, with Justice Scalia writing for the majority, the 
Court reversed, concluding that the restriction imposed by the 
initiative was “of no great constitutional concern” because 
Washington could have gone much further by either restricting 
agency fees to the amount devoted to collective bargaining or by 
“eliminat[ing] agency fees entirely.”142 In other words, since 
Washington could have become a right-to-work state, a statute 
creating an opt-in regime rather than the opt-out rule typically 
followed under Abood was permissible. Moreover, the Court rejected 
the balancing approach pursued by the lower courts, stating that this 
interpretation extended the “agency-fee cases . . . well beyond their 
proper ambit” because unions have “no constitutional entitlement to 
the fees of nonmember-employees.”143 The crucial aspect of the 
Court’s reasoning was its view that the Washington statute did not 
restrict the way that a union spent its money by requiring 
nonmember approval. Rather, the statute restricted use of dues, 
which the Court characterized as “other people’s money.”144 
Because the assertion that the statute regulated expenditure of 
other people’s money was so essential to the reasoning, Justice 
Scalia acknowledged that the union “might have had a point if, as it 
suggests at times, the statute burdened its ability to spend the dues of 
its own members” and not just the dues of nonmembers.145 His 
opinion for the Court further noted that if the union were restricted 
from spending its members’ dues, the expressive associational rights 
of unions would be at stake. In support of this assertion, Justice 
Scalia cited Boy Scouts, which suggests the Court recognized unions 
139. Id. at 360.
140. Id. at 362.
141. 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
142. Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass’n, 551 U.S. 177, 184 (2007).
143. Id. at 185.
144. Id. at 187.
145. Id. at 187 n.2.
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as expressive associations with First Amendment rights.146 
Implicitly, then, the Court recognized the possibility of a First 
Amendment dimension to a statute that burdened the union’s ability 
to use “its” money and expressly connected this to a somewhat 
newer body of case law regarding expressive associations. We turn 
now to those cases and explain why they are implicated by any legal 
rule, such as the one adopted in Harris, that regulates how a union 
spends money it collects from its members. 
B. Freedom of Association, the Association, and Unions
 as Expressive Associations 
At least since the Supreme Court’s landmark 1958 decision in 
NAACP v. Alabama,147 the Court recognized that “[e]ffective 
advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly 
controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association”148 
and declared it “beyond debate” that freedom of association was an 
“inseparable aspect of the ‘liberty’ assured by the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of 
speech.”149 The right of association unfolded, then, not as an 
“independent, cognate right[], but rather as a means to enable free 
speech.”150 Moreover, organizations serve as a means for individuals 
to best effectuate their shared goals such that an organization’s 
values mirror its members’.151 
Nearly thirty years later, in Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees,152 which 
involved a challenge to the Jaycees’ bylaws forbidding all women 
and some men (those of a certain age) from acquiring full 
membership in the organization, the Court described associational 
146. Id.
147. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
148. Id. at 460.
149. Id.
150. Ashutosh Bhagwat, Associational Speech, 120 YALE L.J. 978, 985 (2011); see also John
D. Inazu, The Forgotten Freedom of Assembly, 84 TUL. L. REV. 565, 568 (2010) (“This core role
of assembly and its broad appeal to groups of markedly different ideologies makes it a better ‘fit’
than the right of association within our nation’s legal and political heritage.”).
151. This mirroring underscores the basis for associational standing, which does not treat an
entity as autonomous from its members, but rather as representative. See Hunt v. Wash. State 
Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977) (“Thus we have recognized that an association 
has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members when: (a) its members would otherwise have 
standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the 
organization’s purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the 
participation of individual members in the lawsuit.”). 
152. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
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rights “as an indispensable means of preserving other liberties.”153 
Delineating between two types of constitutionally protected 
freedoms of association, “intimate” and “expressive,” the Court 
stated that expressive association, wherein individuals decide to 
associate “in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic, 
educational, religious, and cultural ends,”154 enjoyed constitutional 
protection because it facilitated an individual’s exercise of her First 
Amendment rights.155 The value of protecting collective efforts on 
behalf of common goals was further linked to preserving diversity of 
thought by ensuring that unpopular and dissident viewpoints had a 
forum for being heard.156 
While the Court recognized that the Jaycees participated in a 
range of First Amendment activities, it ultimately found “no basis in 
the record for concluding that admission of women as full voting 
members w[ould] impede the organization’s ability to engage in 
these protected activities or to disseminate its preferred views.”157 
The local chapters of the Jaycees were large and basically 
unselective groups. Other than sex and age, no criteria existed for 
judging applicants, and new members were recruited and admitted 
with no inquiry into their backgrounds. Moreover, nonmembers were 
able to participate in social functions and attend meetings. Thus, 
even if requiring the Jaycees to conform to the Human Rights Act 
would “interfere with the internal organization or affairs of the 
group,” the Court found these interferences to be minor and therefore 
not likely to “impair the ability of the original members to express 
only those views that brought them together.”158 
In the years immediately following Jaycees, several legal 
challenges were brought against organizations pursuant to 
antidiscrimination statutes, providing the Court with ample 
opportunities to develop further its notion of what constituted 
153. Id. at 618.
154. Id. at 622. The Court additionally acknowledged instances in which intimate and
expressive association coincided and singled out instances “when the State interferes with 
individuals’ selection of those with whom they wish to join in a common endeavor” as a prime 
example. Id. at 618.  
155. Id. (“An individual’s freedom to speak, to worship, and to petition the government for
the redress of grievances could not be vigorously protected from interference by the State unless a 
correlative freedom to engage in group effort toward those ends were not also guaranteed.”). 
156. Id. at 622.
157. Id. at 627–28.
158. Id. at 623.
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expressive association. In Board of Directors of Rotary Club 
International v. Rotary Club,159 a case challenging the International 
Rotary Club’s all-male membership policy, the Court acknowledged 
that while the Clubs participated “in a variety of commendable 
service activities . . . protected by the First Amendment,”160 requiring 
the California branches to adhere to California’s Unruh Civil Rights 
Act did not substantially infringe the ability of the organization to 
participate in these activities: “[The Act] does not require [the Rotary 
Clubs] to abandon their basic goals of humanitarian service, high 
ethical standards in all vocations, good will, and peace. Nor does it 
require them to abandon their classification system or admit 
members who do not reflect a cross section of the community.”161 
Thus, any infringement that existed was ultimately too weak to 
defeat the State’s compelling interest in eradicating discrimination 
and promoting gender equality. 
Likewise, in New York State Club Association v. City of New 
York,162 which involved a legal challenge brought by an association 
of private associations contesting an amendment to New York’s 
Civil Rights statute, the Court held that requiring the associations to 
adhere to the statute did not “affect ‘in any significant way’ the 
ability of individuals to form associations that will advocate public or 
private viewpoints.”163 More recently, in Rumsfeld v. Forum for 
Academic and Institutional Rights,164 where the Court upheld the 
Solomon Amendment, which required law schools to allow military 
recruiters on their campuses, the Court stated that the law did not 
violate the First Amendment because students and faculty remained 
“free to associate to voice their disapproval of the military’s 
message” and “nothing about the statute affect[ed] the composition 
of the group by making group membership less desirable.”165 
In each of these cases, then, the substance and scope of what 
constituted expressive association was defined in relation to 
infringements that made it more difficult for organizations to 
participate in First Amendment activities for which they had been 
159. 481 U.S. 537 (1987).
160. Id. at 548.
161. Id.
162. 487 U.S. 1 (1988).
163. Id. at 13.
164. 547 U.S. 47 (2006).
165. Id. at 69–70.
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formed, or that made membership less attractive, or that made it 
more onerous for an organization to express its values internally as 
well as publicly. In Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & 
Bisexual Group of Boston,166 for example, a turning point in the 
Court’s expressive association jurisprudence, the Court held that 
Boston’s St. Patrick’s Day parade could exclude a group formed by 
gay, lesbian, and bisexual Irish Americans because a parade was “a 
form of expression, not just motion”167 and when its organizers 
selected the parade’s “expressive units,” they were acting like a 
“composer” creating a score. To force the parade organizers to 
include groups that conveyed a message at odds with the organizer’s 
vision was therefore unconstitutional. 
What began as a freedom of individuals to associate in 
furtherance of their shared goals and aspirations gradually morphed 
into a freedom of the “association qua association.”168 The notion of 
an entity enjoying First Amendment protection severed from its 
members, and potentially substantively distinct from its members, 
was indeed central to the Court’s holding in Boy Scouts that the 
forced inclusion of a gay scoutmaster unconstitutionally infringed the 
Boy Scouts’ First Amendment rights as an expressive association.169 
Dispelling the notion that First Amendment protection of expressive 
association was available only to advocacy groups, the Court found 
that a group need only “engage in some form of expression, whether 
it be public or private,” in order to come within the ambit of 
expressive association. The Boy Scouts clearly satisfied this 
requirement because they existed to “transmit a system of values”170 
to their members and the public at large, and the presence of a gay 
scoutmaster evidently subverted their ability to do so: “Dale’s 
presence in the Boy Scouts would, at the very least, force the 
organization to send a message, both to the youth members and the 
world, that the Boy Scouts accepts homosexual conduct as a 
legitimate form of behavior.”171 
166. 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
167. Id. at 568.
168. Wayne Batchis, Citizens United and the Paradox of “Corporate Speech”: From
Freedom of Association to Freedom of the Association, 36 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 5, 16 
(2012). 
169. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000).
170. Id. at 650.
171. Id. at 653.
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In a telling passage, the Court stated that “associations do not 
have to associate for the ‘purpose’ of disseminating a certain 
message in order to be entitled to the protections of the First 
Amendment. An association must merely engage in expressive 
activity that could be impaired in order to be entitled to 
protection.”172 The Court’s acknowledgement of an association’s 
First Amendment rights as somehow autonomous from its members 
was further augmented by its suggestion that an organization could 
take an official position that was contrary to its members’ interests 
and yet still protected by the First Amendment. This expansion of 
First Amendment protection for expressive associations aligns with 
the Court’s expansion of First Amendment protection for corporate 
speech. 
Unions not only satisfy the Court’s articulation of an expressive 
association, they are the paradigmatic expressive association. They 
are political, expressive, and associational. They advocate for labor 
rights, which are—and have always been—civil rights. As Justice 
Frankfurter memorably remarked in his dissent in Street: “To write 
the history of the Brotherhoods, the United Mine Workers, the Steel 
Workers, the Amalgamated Clothing Workers, the International 
Ladies Garment Workers, the United Auto Workers, and leave out 
their so-called political activities and expenditures for them, would 
be sheer mutilation.”173 Indeed, it was the Court’s recognition of 
unions as political that animated its agency-fee jurisprudence. In 
order to protect dissenters from subsidizing beliefs that they did not 
hold, the Court first had to recognize that unions were creatures of 
politics and ideology. 
Unlike in Boy Scouts where the organization’s stance on 
allegedly correct sexual norms was “discovered” in the context of 
litigation and rested almost entirely upon the expression “morally 
straight,” which even the Court conceded was not universally 
understood to mean any particular thing, a union’s mission, values, 
and civic and political positions are self-evident. The SEIU, for 
example, adopted its constitution in order to broadcast and frame its 
devotion to workers’ rights. Its preamble declares that “almost every 
improvement in the condition of working people has been 
172. Id. at 655.
173. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 800 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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accomplished by the efforts of organized labor” and that unions 
provide the best means for protecting “the welfare of wage, salary, 
and professional workers.”174 And in a section entitled “Our vision of 
society,” the virtues of collective action and the importance of 
ensuring that workers have a meaningful voice in decisions that 
affect them unfold through a series of aphorisms.175 This mantra is 
classic political speech that undoubtedly satisfies the extremely low 
bar established in Boy Scouts regarding how to discern if an 
association was expressive by nature and therefore protected under 
the First Amendment. 
Moreover, many of the activities on which the Jaycees Court 
focused when defining what constituted an expressive association, 
including support for political candidates and lobbying, are routine 
for unions. Unions propose and back a wide range of legislation that 
they believe will benefit the employees they represent. They initiate 
litigation and file amicus briefs in appellate and Supreme Court 
cases. And as NRTW has gained ground and strategically deployed 
ballot initiatives in its fight against labor, unions spend money and 
other resources attempting to defeat these initiatives. In 2008, for 
example, the Colorado AFL-CIO in collaboration with a coalition of 
liberal donors entitled Protect Colorado’s Future, spent close to 
thirty-five million dollars in an effort to prevent Colorado from 
becoming a right-to-work state through the adoption of Initiative 47, 
or Colorado Mandatory Labor Union Membership Prohibition 
Initiative.176 One could fairly say that unions have become 
increasingly political as they’ve become increasingly threatened. 
Insofar as the centerpiece of the NLRA is exclusivity, which 
could be described as an experiment in compelled association, unions 
certainly differ from the Boy Scouts, the Jaycees, and other types of 
membership organizations, public or private. They are creatures of a 
statute with an all-comers policy written into their infrastructure. To 
this extent, many of the expressive association cases, which focused 
on compelled membership in the context of anti-discrimination 
174. SERV. EMPS. INT’L UNION, CTW, CLC, CONSTITUTION AND BYLAWS (2008), available
at http://www.seiu.org/images/pdfs/Con.BylawsFinal3.4.9.pdf. 
175. Id.
176. Colorado Mandatory Labor Union Membership Prohibition Initiative 47 (2008),
BALLOTPEDIA, 
http://ballotpedia.org/Colorado_Mandatory_Labor_Union_Membership_Prohibition,_Initiative 
_47_(2008) (last visited Oct. 29, 2014). 
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statutes and the ways that this compulsion might infringe an 
organization’s ability to broadcast its message, may not be factually 
analogous. But the Court’s underlying reasoning as to why and at 
what point infringements become unconstitutional is nonetheless 
applicable, because unions, like the Boy Scouts and the Jaycees, are 
expressive associations protected under the First Amendment, 
regardless of whether they also possess unique statutory rights and 
obligations.177 
C. Subsidizing Free Riders and Subsidizing Union Speech
Harris held that compelled agency fees violate dissenters’ First
Amendment rights because the fees force dissenters to subsidize 
speech. As we have shown, unions and their members also possess 
their own First Amendment rights. Therefore, under the Harris rule, 
the duty of fair representation requires unions and their members to 
subsidize speech—bargaining, contract administration, and even 
lobbying for legislation to benefit workers—on behalf of nonpaying 
nonmembers. The Court in Harris acknowledged the fact of the 
subsidy but dismissed its significance because the subjects of 
bargaining are quite limited under Illinois law and because the union 
apparently does not have to represent individual workers in 
grievance proceedings. Even if the majority is right about the facts, 
its argument goes to the magnitude of the compelled subsidy, not its 
existence. And the Court has never held that compelled payments to 
unions do not violate the First Amendment just because they are 
small. Insofar as the Court is willing to treat collective bargaining 
177. Additionally, while union members’ First Amendment claims parallel unions’, the force
of members’ claims may differ. One can imagine a variety of reasons why a person might decide 
to contribute full membership dues to her union, ranging from inertia to self-interest to politics. In 
a right-to-work state, where an individual has a choice between paying nothing and paying full 
dues—and in a non-right-to-work state where that choice is between an agency fee and full 
dues—the decision to pay full dues is potentially legally significant. Indeed, to the extent that an 
individual voluntarily pays full dues in order to support her union’s political activities, this 
payment could be treated as a political expenditure entitled to vigorous First Amendment 
protection. During oral argument at the Indiana Supreme Court in Sweeney v. Zoeller, a 
companion case to Sweeney v. Pence, brought by the International Union of Operating Engineers, 
a local AFL-CIO branch, Justice David proposed a similar argument when he suggested that 
“members, not the union itself, are having property taken from them. ‘You are forcing people 
who still want to pay dues to subsidize those who don’t.’” See Barb Berggoetz, Right-to-work 
law: Now in the Hands of Indiana Supreme Court, INDY STAR (Sept. 4, 2014, 7:38 AM), 
http://www.indystar.com/story/news/politics/2014/09/04/indiana-supreme-court-hear-right-work 
-arguments-today/15058763/%20.
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and germane activities as speech entitled to First Amendment 
protection, forcing unions to engage in these activities without 
compensation also implicates the First Amendment, first, by 
compelling the union to represent dissenters and second, by forcing 
unions to use members’ dues to subsidize this speech. 
In Sweeney v. Pence,178 the Seventh Circuit entertained and 
ultimately rejected similar First Amendment arguments raised by a 
union challenging Indiana’s new right-to-work law on statutory and 
constitutional grounds.179 The union argued that Indiana’s right-to-
work law was unconstitutional because it enabled “free riders to 
infringe on union members’ First Amendment free speech rights 
and . . . allow[ed] free riders to infringe on the right of union 
membership,” which implicated associational and assembly rights 
protected under the First Amendment.180 Recognizing that unions 
have a First Amendment right to express political and social views, 
the majority opinion observed that the union’s stronger arguments 
pertained to how right-to-work laws “siphon[ed] valuable Union 
resources away from the Union’s political activities.”181 Thus, the 
majority acknowledged what might be called a diversion theory: 
because unions rely solely on membership dues, “right-to-work laws 
effectively tax the First Amendment activities of unions and their 
members by reducing the amount of money unions have to spend on 
First Amendment activity.”182 
However, the majority found this argument “undercut by three 
long-standing principles”: first, “unions have no constitutional 
entitlement to the fees of nonmembers”183; second, and “more 
relevantly, the First Amendment protects the right to be free from 
government abridgement of speech but it does not require the 
government to assist others in funding the expression of particular 
ideas, including political ones”184; third, and here the majority 
pointed to Harris, the Supreme Court has both affirmed the First 
Amendment interests of dissenters and also indicated that “free-rider 
178. 767 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2014).
179. Id. at 665.
180. Id. at 668.
181. Id.
182. Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 8, at 1033. We address the diversion theory infra in text
accompanying note 186. 
183. Sweeney, 767 F.3d at 668 (citation omitted).
184. Id. at 668–69.
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arguments are generally insufficient to overcome First Amendment 
objections.”185 Because the decision not to subsidize a fundamental 
right does not in itself constitute an infringement of that right, the 
majority determined that Indiana’s right-to-work law did not abridge 
the First Amendment and should thus be evaluated under rational 
basis, which the law easily passed.186 
Judge Wood, dissenting, asserted that federal law preempts 
Indiana’s right-to-work law and that the constitutional questions 
raised by right-to-work laws need not be addressed.187 Since the 
majority found no federal preemption, however, Judge Wood 
suggested that the law’s constitutionality should be evaluated under 
the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment because it compelled 
one private party (the union) to give property to another private party 
(the dissenting nonmember) in the form of services that cost 
money.188 In this respect, Indiana’s right-to-work law functionally 
mirrored the state laws at issue in the IOLTA cases,189 which 
compelled clients to donate money to legal foundations and which 
the Supreme Court had assessed under the Takings Clause.190 
185. Id. at 669 (citation omitted).
186. Id. at 669, 671; see also Olney, supra note 125, at 923 (discussing the subsidized speech
doctrine in relation to labor law). 
187. Id. at 671, 680 (Wood, J., dissenting).
188. In an identical challenge to Indiana’s right-to-work law in state court, the trial court
declared the law unconstitutional under the Takings Clause. Sweeney v. Zoeller, No. 45D01–
1305–PL–52 (Super. Ct. of Lake Cnty. Sept. 5, 2013). However, this decision was recently 
reversed by the Indiana Supreme Court. Zoeller v. Sweeney, No. 45S00-1309-PL-596, 2014 WL 
5783599 (Ind. Nov. 6, 2014). The Court did not completely reject the argument that the  
right-to-work law had the effect of a “taking” from the union. Rather, the Court stated that this 
effect was not the consequence of state law but of the union’s federal obligation to represent all 
employees in a bargaining unit fairly. Furthermore, the Court suggested that this federal 
obligation was “optional” insofar as it “occurs only when the union elects to be the exclusive 
bargaining agent, for which it is justly compensated by the right to bargain exclusively with the 
employer.” Id. In a concurring opinion, Judge Rucker emphasized that the majority’s holding did 
not preclude a future as-applied challenge to the law and indicated the need for a more developed 
factual record demonstrating that the “law operates in such a way as to have actually eliminated 
or reduced its compensation from dues or ‘fair share’ payments . . . [and] that upon expiration of 
a valid union security agreement, [a union] was unable to operate in a manner that would allow 
[it] to charge all of its members for the services the Union provided them.” Id. (Rucker, J., 
concurring). Whether a union can disclaim its status as exclusive representative in a right-to-work 
state is, at best, uncertain. One of us has argued that current labor law may allow it, but the 
National Labor Relations Board currently appears to think otherwise. See Fisk & Sachs, supra 
note 34, at 866–73.  
189. See Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216 (2003); Phillips v. Wash. Legal
Found., 524 U.S. 156 (1998). 
190. Sweeney, 767 F.3d at 674.
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Rejecting the majority’s contention that a union’s “seat at the 
bargaining table” sufficiently compensated the union for having to 
financially subsidize nonmembers, Judge Wood emphasized the 
extraordinary costs that exclusivity imposed upon unions and the 
“asymmetry embedded in this system” whereby a union must 
represent all workers in a bargaining unit, expending significant 
financial resources on costly arbitration and grievance processes, 
while an individual can decide to opt out entirely of providing any 
financial support to the union.191 As Judge Wood noted, this system 
generated the kind of “classic ‘free rider’ problem” that exists 
whenever a collective good is involved.192 Because Indiana’s law 
failed to include a solution to the free-rider problem, the law 
implicated “issues of constitutional magnitude,” which Judge Wood 
likened to “a rule providing that, as a condition of receiving a 
business license in a city, a company selling gasoline had to give it 
away to any customer who did not want to pay.”193 
Our focus in this Article is limited to to the First Amendment 
issues that arise when unions are forced to engage in collective 
bargaining and other germane activities without just compensation. 
However, our argument and Judge Wood’s both focus on the role 
that agency fees play in ensuring that competing constitutional rights 
are mutually respected, which we discuss at greater length below.  
V. UNION REPRESENTATION IN THE POST-HARRIS WORLD
Harris is not the last word on constitutional challenges to union 
representation on the basis of exclusivity and majority rule, as the 
Supreme Court on June 30, 2015 granted review in Friedrichs v. 
California Teachers Ass’n194 on the questions whether Abood should 
be overruled and, alternatively, whether the First Amendment 
requires agency fees to be collected on an opt-in rather than opt-out 
basis.195 If the Court agrees with the petitioners in Friedrichs, it will 
either extend Harris to all public sector employees (or perhaps just to 
191. Id. at 673.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 683.
194. No. 13-57095 (9th Cir. Nov. 18, 2014), cert. granted, No. 14-915, 2015 U.S. LEXIS
4503 (June 30, 2015). 
195. Id. The petitioners in Friedrichs argued that Abood should be overruled and,
alternatively, that the First Amendment requires that teachers opt into paying union dues rather 
than opt out.   
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all teachers) or will decide that the opt-out regime for collecting 
agency fees that NRTW has tried to adopt legislatively (as in 
Davenport v. Washington Education Ass’n196) is constitutionally 
compelled. One obvious implication of the Court’s decision in 
Harris, as the Justices realized at the Harris oral argument, is that if 
payment of fees to a union is compelled speech in violation of the 
First Amendment, then appointment of a union to speak on behalf of 
dissenting employees would equally appear to be compelled speech. 
While the NRTW lawyer backed away from (though did not 
disavow) this argument in the Harris oral argument, it may well arise 
again in Friedrichs. Moreover, NRTW has already brought litigation 
challenging exclusivity under the Railway Labor Act, and the 
argument has also been made in various ways in other cases arguing 
that aspects of teachers’ unions violate the First Amendment rights of 
public school teachers.197 On the other side, as we have shown, once 
the First Amendment rights of unions and union members are 
recognized, right-to-work legislation becomes acutely troubling on 
constitutional grounds because the confluence of exclusivity and the 
duty of fair representation forces unions to provide free legal services 
to free riders in right-to-work states. In this light, the law as it existed 
in non-right-to-work states prior to Harris looks like a reasonable 
accommodation of the competing First Amendment concerns. The 
union owes all employees it represents a duty of fair representation, 
and it can charge all the cost of its representational services, but it 
cannot charge dissenters for political speech unrelated to its role as 
exclusive bargaining representative. 
A. Modifying the Duty of Fair Representation in the
Right-to-Work Regime 
The judicially created duty of fair representation originally 
emerged to address racial discrimination in employment. In Steele v. 
196. 551 U.S. 177 (2007).
197. See Serna v. Transp. Workers Union of Am., No. 3:13-CV-2659-N, 2014 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 181701 (N.D. Tex., Dec. 3, 2014) (certifying a class of non-members of a union for a 
constitutional challenge to exclusive representation under RLA). In Bain v. California Teachers 
Association, a case filed in the Central District of California in April 2015, teachers argue that 
their union violates the First Amendment by providing benefits only to members and by not 
allowing nonmembers to vote on contract ratification and other matters of internal union 
governance. Emma Brown, California Teachers Unions Face New Legal Challenge over Dues, 
WASH. POST (Apr. 7, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/local/wp/2015/04/07/ 
california-teachers-unions-face-new-legal-challenge-over-dues. 
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Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co.,198 the Court recognized that a 
union’s power to serve as an exclusive representative came with a 
corresponding duty to represent all employees fairly.199 In a series of 
cases between 1944 and 1967 when Vaca v. Sipes200 was decided, the 
Court continued to develop the substance of this duty.201 By the time 
the Court decided Vaca, establishing a union’s duty to represent 
employees in contractual grievance arbitration, the duty of fair 
representation was described as “a bulwark to prevent arbitrary union 
conduct against individuals stripped of traditional forms of redress 
by the provisions of federal labor law,” suggesting that it had 
matured into a federal common law obligation.202 However, the duty 
of fair representation was never intended to force unions to represent 
nonpaying members for free. It emerged to protect workers, not to 
undercut unions. 
Although the desire to protect workers from arbitrary, 
discriminatory, or bad faith practices persists, the way that the Court 
has interpreted this duty, as we have discussed above, raises 
constitutional concerns in the right-to-work context on a few levels. 
Any union operating in a right-to-work state must bargain in good 
faith on behalf of all employees, including employees who have 
decided to opt out entirely of paying any union dues. Therefore, in 
right-to-work states, unions are required by federal labor law, and 
often by state statute, to negotiate and engage in contract arbitration 
on behalf of employees who contribute absolutely nothing to the 
union.203 And if a governing collective bargaining agreement 
198. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
199. Steele involved a group of black firemen who accused their union of amending an
existing collective bargaining agreement to exclude them from service, job promotions, and 
assignments to permanent vacancies. The Court held that the union had a duty to exercise its 
power as exclusive representatives in a nondiscriminatory manner and inferred this duty from the 
principle of exclusivity. Id. at 192, 194–97, 207. 
200. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
201. See Vincent Martin Bonventre, The Duty of Fair Representation Under the Taylor Law:
Supreme Court Development, New York State Adoption and a Call for Independence, 20 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1, 10–11 (1992) (surveying the evolution of the duty of fair representation).  
202. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 (1967); see also Emporium Capwell Co. v. W.
Addition Cmty. Org., 420 U.S. 50, 64 (1975) (“[W]e have held, by the very nature of the 
exclusive bargaining representative’s status as representative of all unit employees, Congress 
implicitly imposed upon it a duty fairly and in good faith to represent the interests of minorities 
within the unit.”).  
203. In Restoring Equity in Right-to-Work Law, Professors Fisk and Sachs contend that this
“confluence of federal and state rules . . . creates an inequity in U.S. labor law that calls for 
resolution” and suggest three novel solutions for resolving the resultant inequities. While their 
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incorporates statutory rights, then unions also have a duty to 
represent employees in their statutory claims.204 
After Harris, uncompensated union representation itself 
implicates the First Amendment because the majority treats things 
like negotiation over wages as political and therefore as compelled 
speech. Under the same logic, then, when unions are required to 
engage in such activities on behalf of nonpayers, this also constitutes 
compelled speech, only of the union and its members. Secondly, and 
this is more in keeping with the diversion theory, when unions are 
forced to use their general treasury funds to subsidize the costs of 
these services, this drains a union’s reserves, directly affecting its 
abilities to spend on First Amendment activities including, most 
importantly, political speech.205 
Whether the union’s obligation to expend money on behalf of 
nonpayers is regarded as compelled speech or as the regulation of 
political expenditures, on the Harris analysis a law requiring it is 
subject to heightened judicial scrutiny.206 Accordingly, under the 
Harris majority’s reasoning, a right-to-work law combined with the 
duty of fair representation would be constitutionally viable only if 
the state could demonstrate that there was a compelling interest in 
requiring unions to continue to negotiate and grieve their 
nonmembers’ complaints without receiving just compensation and 
that this duty was narrowly tailored to effectuate this interest. 
Nothing in Harris suggests how such a burden can be met, if 
requiring dissenters to pay for services is not constitutional. To be 
clear, we do not contend that exclusive representation and the duty of 
fair representation are unconstitutional. Rather, it has been settled 
since the Court rejected a substantive due process attack on the 
National Labor Relations Act in 1937207 that the government has an 
interest in regulating labor relations through a bargaining agent 
chosen by a majority but empowered to speak on behalf of all. Our 
focus is statutory, this essay is solely concerned with the constitutional claims that emerge when 
unions are forced to use union members’ dues to subsidize negotiation and contract arbitration. 
Nonetheless, and as discussed in the conclusion, the solutions they devise are equally amenable to 
the constitutional quagmire. Fisk & Sachs, supra note 34, at 859. 
204. 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 271 (2009).
205. See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 8, at 1033.
206. See, e.g., Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2289 (2012);
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 340–41 (2010); Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 423–24 
(1988); First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978). 
207. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
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only point is that states have no compelling interest in forcing the 
union to do so for free. 
Although there exists a compelling interest in ensuring that all 
members of a bargaining unit receive adequate and equal 
representation by their union and in protecting dissenters’ First 
Amendment rights, so, too, is there a compelling interest in 
protecting the First Amendment rights of unions and union members. 
The duty of fair representation is narrowly tailored to effectuate these 
competing interests and, by extension, to effectuate Congress’ 
broader interest in promoting industrial democracy if it allows the 
union to charge all those whom it represents for the cost of doing so. 
Even the majority in Sweeney v. Pence208 suggested that modifying 
the duty of fair representation in the right-to-work context might be 
an appropriate solution for protecting a union’s First Amendment 
interests.209 Indeed, it is hard to imagine why Congress would have 
pursued exclusivity while at the same time allowing states to 
statutorily forbid unions from obtaining compensation for their 
services. Put another way, why would Congress adopt legislation to 
stabilize labor relations and that “entrusted administration of the 
labor policy for the Nation to a centralized administrative agency,”210 
while simultaneously ensuring that this statutory scheme could be 
entirely undone by the states? To the extent that the duty of fair 
representation in the right-to-work context undermines the very spirit 
and purpose of the NLRA, we believe that it is both timely and 
necessary to reconceive the contours of this duty in a context-specific 
manner. For example, one can envision a variety of avenues that 
would offer better protection for all of the implicated interests, from 
unions being able to charge on a case-by-case basis for 
representational services211 to members-only bargaining in right-to-
work regimes.212 
208. 767 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2014).
209. Id. at 666 (“[T]he dissent has not explained why the proper remedy would be to strike
down Indiana’s right-to-work statute rather than striking down or modifying the federal law 
imposing on all unions the duty of fair representation, in right-to-work states and  
non-right-to-work states alike.”).  
210. Wisconsin Dep’t of Indus., Labor & Human Relations v. Gould Inc., 475 U.S. 282, 290
(1986) (citing San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, Millmen’s Union, Local 2020 v. Garmon, 359 
U.S. 236, 242 (1959)). 
211. See, e.g., Cone v. Nev. Serv. Employees Union/SEIU Local 1107, 998 P. 2d. 1178,
1182–83 (Nev. 2000) (holding that a law allowing unions to charge for representational services 
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B. Fair-Share Fees—A Reasonable Compromise?
As we have explained, language in the majority opinion in 
Harris suggested that at least Justice Alito thinks Abood should be 
overruled because the line between political and nonpolitical speech 
in the public sector setting is too difficult to draw. In his view, 
government employee pay and working conditions are political 
issues because they affect Medicaid funding and the state budget. If 
that is right, not only might he think that all government employment 
should be strictly on a right-to-work basis but also that public 
employee bargaining must be on a members-only basis. If it violates 
a worker’s First Amendment right to have the union spend her 
money to advocate positions in bargaining with which she disagrees, 
why does it not violate her rights even more strongly to have the 
union speak on her behalf? 
We, on the other hand, have argued that there is no First 
Amendment incursion when a union collects money to represent 
employees because the compulsory payment of agency fees is not 
speech, does not limit a dissenter’s speech rights, and rather should 
be regarded as part of a scheme of economic regulation.213  
A variety of relatively extreme positions thus have some First 
Amendment support, discussed below.  
Ours: that all the dues-objector cases were wrong and there is no 
First Amendment problem with contracts requiring all represented 
employees to pay an amount equal to full union dues and, in the 
alternative, that right-to-work laws violate the First Amendment 
rights of unions to the extent they compel unions to provide free 
representational services to nonpayers. 
The current Court’s: that some public employment must be on a 
right-to-work basis. 
The National Right-to-Work Committee’s: that all public sector 
bargaining must be on a right-to-work basis and, even more 
radically, that union representation on the basis of exclusivity 
violates the First Amendment. 
Perhaps a compromise is in order. 
on an individual basis did not offend Nevada’s right-to-work regime because exclusivity 
established a “mutuality of obligation”).  
212. See Fisk & Sachs, supra note 34, at 866–73.
213. We will leave for another article the task of explaining why exclusive representation is
not compelled speech. 
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In Street, Justice Brennan emphasized that “[t]o attain the 
appropriate reconciliation between majority and dissenting interests 
in the area of political expression . . . the courts in administering the 
Act should select remedies which protect both interests to the 
maximum extent possible without undue impingement of one on the 
other.”214 By forcing unions to spend their own or even “other 
people’s money,” i.e., their members’ dues that could otherwise be 
spent on core political speech and activities, the Court has allowed 
the First Amendment rights of dissenters to trump the First 
Amendment rights of unions and members. Yet, this makes little 
sense. If a fair-share provision is premised on the idea that one can 
delineate between what is and is not political in terms of members’ 
dues, then why should the financial support that goes to collective 
bargaining enjoy greater First Amendment protection than the 
financial support that goes to support a political candidate? That is to 
say, why should the dues that go to support what the Court itself has 
framed as less political activities sustain stronger First Amendment 
claims than the dues that members have willingly contributed for 
political purposes?215 
Although agency fees were originally designed to protect the 
First Amendment rights of nonmembers, once the First Amendment 
interests of unions and union members are thrown into the mix, 
agency fees acquire even stronger constitutional support. Arguably, 
they protect three sets of interests simultaneously: nonmembers from 
having to subsidize the political and ideological pursuits of the 
union, union members from having to subsidize the political and 
ideological beliefs of nonmembers, and unions who strive to protect 
their workers’ interests and can only do so when they are able to 
fully participate in the political landscape. To this extent, then, and to 
borrow the language of strict scrutiny, agency fees are narrowly 
214. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 773 (1961).
215. Harris, of course, suggests that the division between political and nonpolitical
expenditures is difficult if not impossible to draw in the public sector context. Thus, Harris 
subverts what we have been referring to as a diversion theory whereby money intended for one 
type of activity transforms into a subsidy for another type of activity that enjoys less First 
Amendment protection than the first. However, until Abood is overturned, it is Harris and not 
Abood that is the anomaly. And regardless, in right-to-work states, public and private sector 
unions are both forbidden from including agency fees in their collective bargaining agreements, 
and even the Harris majority recognized that in the private sector bargaining over wages is not 
political. 
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tailored or the least restrictive means of effectuating these competing 
interests. 
VI. CONCLUSION
Unions are one of a number of private organizations that are 
empowered and required by law to speak on behalf of people. They 
also are one of a number on which regulatory regimes rely to provide 
services and manage people. They are not unique in using money 
raised from those whom they represent to speak and act on behalf of 
those whom they represent. But unions are in a class by themselves 
in terms of the legal controversy around their status as 
representatives and, especially, the controversy about their ability to 
charge fees for the services they provide. We have argued that the 
First Amendment controversy about union fees was misguided from 
the start, and Harris made it substantially worse. 
While, in our view, the requirement to pay for union services is 
not compelled speech, the Court’s entire agency-fee jurisprudence, 
including Harris, insists that it is. If this is the case, however, laws 
and contracts that require unionized employees to pay for union 
representational services compel speech of dissenters exactly to the 
same extent that their prohibition compels speech of unions and their 
members. Once the First Amendment rights of unions and union 
members are recognized, agency-fee or fair-share provisions emerge 
as a constitutionally sound accommodation of the interests of 
dissenters, unions, and union members. 
Many in the labor community believe that the Supreme Court’s 
assault on agency fees—and unions more generally—suggests that 
unions must strive to convert agency-fee payers into full-paying 
members. The SEIU and AFL-CIO have been engaged in aggressive 
efforts to do just that. And, as we have argued, unions and union 
members possess strong First Amendment claims and, we believe, 
now is the time to begin developing these claims in the context of 
litigation. Thus, while the Court may have turned its back on labor, 
we remain hopeful that this might generate positive effects for the 
movement. 
